The Assault on Reason, by Al Gore : on War & Peace

Eric Shinseki: 2003: Undercut for disagreeing with White House on Iraq

Unfortunately, the Pentagon was forced to discard many of thee lessons during its preparations for invading Iraq. For example, the size of the US invasion force, we now know, was far smaller than military experts had recommended. In February 2003, before the war began, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki told Congress that the occupation could require several hundred thousand troops, but the White House had already decided that a much smaller force was adequate. Rather than engaging in a reasoned debate on the question, they undercut Shinseki for disagreeing with their preconceived notion--even though he was an expert and they were not.

The other generals and admirals got the message and stopped expressing disagreement with the White House. Shinseki had been right, of course.

George W. Bush: 9/11: Persisted in seeking Iraq link to terrorist attacks

The day after the attack, the president did not ask about Osama bin Laden. He did not ask Mr. Clarke about al-Qaeda. He did not ask about Saudi Arabia or any country other than Iraq. When Clarke responded to that first question by saying that Iraq was not responsible for the attack and that al-Qaeda was, the president persisted in focusing on Iraq.

Al Gore: Bush engaged in mass deception of the US public about Iraq

It is important to understand how such a horrible set of mistakes could have been made in a great democracy. And it is already obvious that the administration’s abnormal and un-American approach to secrecy, censorship, and massive systematic deception is the principal explanation for how America embraced this catastrophe.

Five years after Pres. Bush first made his case for an invasion of Iraq, it is now clear that virtually all of the arguments he made were based on falsehoods. We were told by the president that war was his last choice. But it is now clear that it was always his first preference.