Richard Nixon in The Real War
On Foreign Policy:
Revitalize Monroe Doctrine to counter indirect aggression
The Monroe Doctrine must be revitalized and redefined to counter indirect aggression, which was not a threat 150 years ago. The US should make it clear that we will resist intervention in Latin America not only by foreign governments but also by Latin
American governments controlled by a foreign power. Of the total of 10 million Cubans, more than 40,000 are now acting as proxies for Soviet expansion in Africa. This is the equivalent of sending an army of nearly 1 million Americans overseas to fight--
almost twice the highest number we had in Vietnam. Tiny Cuba, under Soviet tutelage, has become a major imperialist power. Castro has made Cuba a disaster area. He must not be allowed, with Soviet support, to foist his discredited economic and political
systems on other countries in Latin America. Any such effort at subversion should be firmly and unmistakably checked, and both Soviets and Cubans should be told in advance that any interference here will bring far more than a diplomatic protest from us.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p. 36
Apr 1, 1980
On Energy & Oil:
Oil for now; solar & geothermal for the 21st century
Sometime in the 21st century, nuclear, solar, & geothermal may be sufficiently developed to meet the world's energy needs. But for now we live in an age of oil. In the decades just ahead this gives extraordinary strategic significance to the Persian
Gulf. This means that one of the world's most troubled, unstable, and imperiled areas is also one of its most vital. In the industrial age energy is the lifeblood of the economic system, and economic power is the foundation of military power.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p. 72-74
Apr 1, 1980
On Foreign Policy:
Islamic modernization is wrenching but must be done
The "Islamic revolution" defies simple categorization. Among the world's 800 million Moslems there are more non-Arabs than Arabs; Moslems form a majority or a sizable minority in seventy countries. The world's most populous Moslem country is Indonesia.
There are more Moslems in India, Nigeria, the Soviet Union, and even China than in most countries of the Middle East. Modernization--which often means Westernization--has been a wrenching experience for these traditional societies, and the
United States has become a convenient whipping boy for those torn between the strict teachings of the past and the lures or demands of the modern world.
Conserving the best of traditional Islam while satisfying the needs of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries will challenge the wisest reformers. But it must be done.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p. 92
Apr 1, 1980
On War & Peace:
Vietnam goals: de-Americanize; pacify; then withdrawal
When I took office in 1969 it was obvious the American strategy in Vietnam needed drastic version. My administration was committed to formulating a strategy that would end American involvement in the war and enable South Vietnam to win.
Our goals were:- Reverse the "Americanization" of the war that had occurred from 1965 to 1968 and concentrate instead on Vietnamization.
- Give more priority to pacification so that the South Vietnamese could be better able to extend their control
over the countryside.
- Reduce the invasion threat by destroying enemy sanctuaries and supply lines in Cambodia and Laos.
- Withdraw the half million American troops from Vietnam in a way that would not bring about a collapse in the South.
-
Negotiate a cease-fire and a peace treaty.
- Demonstrate our willingness and determination to stand by our ally if the peace agreement was violated by Hanoi, and assure South Vietnam that it would continue to receive our military aid.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.106
Apr 1, 1980
On Homeland Security:
Military superiority will not deter terrorism
More nuclear bombs, unquestioned military superiority, and massively superior economic strength will not deter revolutionary war, terrorism, or other forms of communist aggression that fall short of conventional war.
The United States, our allies, and friends must develop power commensurate with the power being used against us. It makes no sense to try to use a sledgehammer to kill a fly.
That kind of enemy calls for a less powerful but more effective weapon--a fly swatter.In these situations it is not the balance of power in the arsenal that counts, it is the balance of power on the battlefield.
The Nixon Doctrine provided that the United States would supply arms and assistance to nations threatened by aggression, if they were willing to assume primary responsibility for providing the manpower necessary for their defense.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.197
Apr 1, 1980
On Budget & Economy:
1971 price & wage freeze helped only for the short-term
On August 15, 1971, I did something that went against my every instinct about what is good for the American economy: I imposed a 90-day nationwide freeze on wages and prices, to be followed by a gradual return to decontrol.
History told me that while controls might be politically popular, they would be economically disastrous.Over my protests, an opposition-controlled Congress had given me power to impose controls. With inflation worsening, there was a swelling chorus of
demands in Congress and the media that the power be used.
When controls were imposed in August 1971 the nation stirred with excitement and sighed with relief. In the first day's trading, the Dow Jones average on Wall Street rose
33 points. But it was a false euphoria. In the short term, controls provided relief; in the long term, they made the situation worse. Once in place, they were more difficult to get rid of in an orderly way than I had expected.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.219
Apr 1, 1980
On Energy & Oil:
Project Independence: replace oil with nuclear & renewables
I was the first president to propose a wide-ranging energy program. I did so nearly a decade ago, in 1971. In my last State of the Union address, in January 1974,
I described energy as our number-one priority.The goal of my energy policy--which I named
Project Independence--was in the long run, to stimulate the production of energy from renewable sources such as nuclear power, and, in the short run, to cut back our dependency on unreliable foreign suppliers of oil.
The United States is uniquely qualified to do these things. Ill-considered government policies, however, have had the opposite effect; they have actually increased our dependence on foreign oil.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.222-223
Apr 1, 1980
On Homeland Security:
We must be ready with resources & will to use them
The West, today, has crossed the threshold of a period of acute crisis in which its survival into the 21st century is directly at stake. We have the material capacity, the economic and technological strength, to prevail--which means to maintain our
freedom and to avert a major war. But the capacity alone is not enough. We have the resources and the manpower. Have we the will to use them?There are two aspects to national will. There is will as demonstrated by the nation itself, and there is will
as perceived by the nation's adversaries. In averting the ultimate challenge, perceived will can be as important as actual will.
National will involves far more than readiness to use military power whether nuclear or conventional.
It includes a readiness to allocate the resources necessary to maintain that power. It includes also a basic, crystalline faith that the US is on the right side in the struggle, and that what we represent in the world is worth defending.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p. 7-8
Jan 1, 1981
On War & Peace:
Afghan invasion shows that whole world affects US security
In a carefully prepared and brazenly executed move, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan on Christmas Eve. President Amin was killed; a reliably pliant Soviet puppet was put in as Amin's replacement. The proud people of Afghanistan were crushed, and Russia
came one country closer to achieving its goals of a warm-water port on the Arabian Sea and control over the oil of the Persian Gulf.The Soviet seizure of Afghanistan is a continuation of the old tsarist imperialism. It also is a stark reminder that
America no longer has the luxury of considering any place on earth too remote to affect its own security.
What made the fall of Afghanistan so significant a loss to the West was not just the fate of its 18 million people, nor its strategic location.
But it did not occur in isolation. It was part of a pattern of ceaseless building by the Soviets toward a position of overwhelmingly military force, to take over one country after another, until they are in a position to conquer or Finlandize the world.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p. 12-13
Jan 1, 1981
On Foreign Policy:
China fears USSR & is USSR's major vulnerability
We should recognize the strengths but also the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the opposing forces.The most dramatic of those vulnerabilities lies in the deep and perhaps irreconcilable differences between the Soviet Union and China.
China's economy is still weak, and its nuclear capability is still relatively primitive.
But with a billion of the world's potentially most able people on its longest frontier, under control of a government that looks toward Moscow with bitter hostility, the leaders of the Kremlin have reason to be apprehensive.
In the long run China may post an expansionist threat to the West. But for the present China fears the Soviet Union and needs the West.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p. 15
Jan 1, 1981
On Homeland Security:
Detente is understanding between opponents, not a lovefest
We must understand that detente is not a love-fest. It is an understanding between nations that have opposite purposes, but which share certain common interests, including the avoidance of nuclear war. Such an understanding can work--that is,
it can restrain aggression and deter war--only as long as the potential aggressor is made to recognize that neither aggression nor war will be profitable.The capitalist system works on the basis of the profit motive economically.
The Soviet system works on the basis of the profit motive militarily and territorially. When the Kremlin calculates that is has more to gain than to lose by an act of aggression, subversion, or intimidation, it will engage in such action.
Each time the West appears weak or irresolute, the potential cost of aggression falls and the Kremlin's market "demand" increases. Each time the East shows itself ready to resist effectively, the cost rises and the market dries up.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p. 16
Jan 1, 1981
On War & Peace:
WWIII has been waged between US and USSR since 1945
World War III began before WWII ended: Stalin had his eye clearly fixed on his postwar objectives for a divided postwar world. WWIII has proceeded from the Soviet seizure of Eastern Europe, through the communist conquest of China, the wars in Korea and
Indochina, and the establishment of a western hemisphere outpost of the Soviet power in Cuba, to the present thrusts by the Soviet Union and its allies into Africa, the Islamic crescent, and Central America. The expansionism has been accompanied by a
prodigious military buildup that has brought the Soviet Union on the verge of the decisive supremacy over the West.WWIII is the first truly global war. No corner of the earth is beyond its reach. The US & the Soviet Union have both become global
powers, and whatever affects the balance between us anywhere affects that balance everywhere. Military power, economic power, willpower, and the clarity of a nation's sense of purpose--each of these is vital to the outcome.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p. 19-22
Jan 1, 1981
On Homeland Security:
USSR tries to beat US by weakening our will
We are the principal obstacle between the Soviet Union and its goal of world domination. The Soviets know they will never be able to outproduce us economically. They also know they can only hope to overwhelm us militarily if our guard remains down long
enough to let them get a decisive advantage. But in our will they sense a weakness that could offset the margin of safety our other strengths give us.This is the Soviet strategy. They seek first to demoralize us so that they can then destroy us.
They want to end World War III [the Cold War] not with a bang, but with a whimper.
- They try to deceive us in order to disguise their intentions and make us relax our will;
-
They try to make us feel guilty and defensive, even about our most dramatic successes, so that our will is paralyzed;
- They try to break our will by bullying us with threats and bluffs.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p. 47-48
Jan 1, 1981
On Foreign Policy:
Anti-communist since 1946's Iron Curtain
During World War II, I became strongly pro-Russian as the Soviet Union fought alongside us in the war against Hitler. My attitude began to change in 1946, in part because of Winston Churchill "Iron Curtain" speech. At first I thought that Churchill might
have gone too far, but these doubts were soon removed by Stalin's actions. When Pres. Truman asked for aid to Greece and Turkey and initiated the Marshall Plan, I strongly supported both in Congress.In my travels as VP, in 1959
I visited the Soviet Union. In the heart of Siberia in Novosibirsk, away from the tight control of the central government of Moscow thousands of Russians swarmed around us shouting "mir y druzhabe"--"Peace and friendship."
The people wanted friendship; the leaders, however, made no bones about the fact that they wanted something different. As Khrushchev put it coldly, "Your grandchildren will live under communism."
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p. 52-53
Jan 1, 1981
On War & Peace:
Iraq has threatened Kuwait since 1960s
Radical Iraq is now the most powerful military force in the Gulf. Its military strength is overwhelming in strictly regional terms. Even without any further Soviet support, the Iraqis could move with impunity anywhere they decided to: in Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, or Iran.Iraqi military forces have already been deployed against Kuwait--in 1961 and again in 1973. In the 1961 incident the British and the other Arabs forced the Iraqis to pull their massed troops back from the Kuwait border.
In the 1973 incident, however, the Iraqis did not back down, but took some Kuwaiti territory. Iraq has since settled its border differences with Kuwait, but the possibility of future problems remains.
The vast majority of the crude oil reserves in the
Persian Gulf are within a few hundred miles of the Iraqi border--in the nearby areas of Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. The payoff for a successful Iraqi move into any one or all of these areas would be an enormous transfer of assets.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p. 93
Jan 1, 1981
On War & Peace:
Defuse the Palestinian timebomb, but no quick fix
The Palestinian time bomb must be defused before we face another Yom Kippur crisis. It would be presumptuous and foolhardy to suggest that there is some magic formula, some quick fix, for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There are, however, some
basic principles that must form the foundation of any viable policy.- Whatever group does in fact or claims to represent the Palestinians must recognize Israel's right to exist in peace and must reject the use of terrorism or armed actions against
Israel or Israeli citizens.
- Israel must comply with the provisions of UN Resolution 242 with regard to the return of occupied territories. However, Israel is entitled to secure borders and cannot and should not be expected to agree to setting up a
hostile armed state in its gut on the West Bank.
- Occupied territories that are returned should be demilitarized.
- Jordan can play a constructive role in resolving the Palestinian issue.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.101-102
Jan 1, 1981
On War & Peace:
Key to Israel's survival is keeping Soviets
Israel demonstrated in 4 wars that it can hold its own against its neighbors. But if the Soviet Union were to stage a full-scale intervention, as it threatened to do in 1973, Israel would go down the tube. Even if Israel has or acquires nuclear weapons,
its modest nuclear capability would not be a deterrent against the nuclear might of the Soviet Union. The key to Israel's survival, therefore, is our determination to hold the ring against the Soviets.Our airlift to Israel and the alert of our forces
which I ordered in 1973 with the knowledge that these actions might lead to an Arab oil embargo were a demonstration of how far the US will go to keep our commitment to Israel's survival and to prevent Soviet intervention in the area.
But that decision
was a close call then and it will be even closer in the future as the Soviets gain clear nuclear superiority. The Palestinian issue is a rallying cry for radical forces throughout the area and is constantly exploited by the Soviet Union.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.101-102
Jan 1, 1981
On Energy & Oil:
Protect oil supplies with military force when needed
The strategic position of the entire Western alliance hinges on reliable access to crude oil from the Persian Gulf. We must be ready and willing to take whatever steps, including a strong military presence and even military action, are required to
protect our interests. We must also be able to back up our words.It is essential the US have base facilities so located as to enable us to project our power convincingly into the area, and to respond swiftly to sudden threats. We also need to assure
access to bases in Western Europe that could be used to facilitate airlift and sealift operations between the US, and the Persian Gulf. And then, when we do project power, we must do so resolutely.
Above all, the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Kuwait and other key states must be unequivocally reassured that should they be threatened by revolutionary forces, either internally or externally, the US will stand strongly with them so that they will not suffer the same fate as the Shah.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.103-104
Jan 1, 1981
On War & Peace:
Goal was Vietnamization, pacification, & US withdrawal
In 1969, my administration was committed to formulating a strategy that would end American involvement in the war and enable South Vietnam to win. Our goals were to:- Reverse the "Americanization" of the war that had occurred from 1965 to 1968 and
concentrate instead on Vietnamization.
- Give more priority to pacification so that the South Vietnamese could be better able to extend their control over the countryside.
- Reduce the invasion threat by destroying enemy sanctuaries & supply lines in
Cambodia and Laos.
- Withdraw the half million American troops from Vietnam in a way that would not bring about a collapse in the South.
- Negotiate a cease-fire and a peace treaty.
- Demonstrate our willingness and determination to
stand by our ally if the peace agreement was violated by Hanoi, and assure South Vietnam that it would continue to receive our military aid as Hanoi did from its allies, the Soviet Union and, to lesser extent, China.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.116
Jan 1, 1981
On War & Peace:
Cambodia: Secret bombing was invited by Prince Sihanouk
In 1968 Prince Sihanouk said "We don't want any Vietnamese in Cambodia.We will be very glad if you solve our problem..I want you to force the Vietcong to leave Cambodia."In March 1969, in response to a major new offensive that the
North Vietnamese had launched against our forces in South Vietnam, I ordered the bombing of enemy-occupied base areas in Cambodia. The bombing was not publicly announced because of our concern that if it were Sihanouk would be forced to object to it.
However, even after it was disclosed by leads to the New York Times in April, Sihanouk did not object. On the contrary, in May
1969, two months after the bombing had started, he said, "Cambodia only protests against the destruction of the property and lives of Cambodians.If there is a buffalo or any other Cambodian killed, I will be informed immediately....and I will protest."
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.118
Jan 1, 1981
On War & Peace:
We won militarily in Vietnam, & then threw away our victory
By following strategy I initiated in 1969, we and the South Vietnamese were able to win the war militarily by Jan. 1973. The 550,000 American troops that were in Vietnam had been withdrawn and South Vietnam was able to defend itself.But the public had
been so misinformed and misled by unwise government actions and the shallow, inflammatory treatment of events by the media that morale within the US collapsed just when the North was overwhelmingly defeated on the battlefield. We won a victory after a
long hard struggle, but then we threw it away.
The war-making capacity of North Vietnam had been virtually destroyed by the bombings in Dec. 1972, and we had the means to make and enforce a just peace, a peace with honor. But we were denied these means
when Congress prohibited military operations. A major part of the blame must be borne by those who encouraged war in the 1960's, and who then by their later actions sabotaged our efforts to get us out in an acceptable way in the 1970's.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.130-131
Jan 1, 1981
On China Book:
Beijing split among Marxists, Maoists & economic pragmatists
Three lines of thought were in more or less constant contention among the Chinese leadership. One. was the classic doctrinaire Marxist-Lennist-Stalinist line that looked to Moscow.. This was in the ascendancy in the early years. Another, identified today
with Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, was essentially pragmatic, concerned with economic development and willing to compromise ideology and deal with the West. This is in the ascendancy now. The 3rd, Mao's own, was rooted in the experience of the Long March
and devoted to the ideal of constant struggle: revolution was an end in itself; whenever any group, including the Communist Party bureaucracy, got too entrenched or too comfortable, it was time to turn the country upside down. The people's communes, the
Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, all were examples of Mao's determination to maintain the spirit of struggle and purify through purge, chaos, and dislocation; millions died in his drive to keep the "revolution" revolutionary.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.145-146
Jan 1, 1981
On China Book:
Bring China into world community, but with restraints
In a 1967 article in the quarterly Foreign Affairs, I had written that "taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations.. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able
people to live in angry isolation." But I also argued that for the short run we needed "a policy of firm restraint of no reward, of a creative counterpressure designed to persuade Peking that its interests can be served only by accepting the basic rules
of international civility," so that China could finally be pulled "back into the world community--but as a great and progressing nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution." The time when "the dialogue with mainland China can begin," I wrote, would
be when the leaders in Peking were persuaded "to turn their energies inward rather than outward." One of my first acts as President was to direct that we explore privately the possibilities of a rapprochement with China.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.149
Jan 1, 1981
On Foreign Policy:
Bring China into world community, but with restraints
In 1967, I wrote "taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies and threaten its neighbors." But for the short run we needed "a policy of firm restraint of no reward, of
a creative counterpressure designed to persuade Peking that its interests can be served only by accepting the basic rules of international civility," so that China could finally be pulled "back into the world community--but as a great and progressing
nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution." Dialogue with mainland China could begin when the leaders in Peking were persuaded "to turn their energies inward rather than outward." One of my first acts as President was to direct that we explore
privately the possibilities of a rapprochement with China. This proceeded at first as a sort of slow ritual dance, but the steps rapidly gained momentum in 1971 until, on July 15, I made the surprise announcement that I would visit China in early 1972.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.149
Jan 1, 1981
On China Book:
China needs our technology and our money
The Chinese know that we have no territorial designs on them. They respect and want our technological and financial assistance.. Some argue that economic interdependence is enough to hold us together. This is not true. Above all, the Chinese leaders want
China to survive.. If, with our assistance, they become stronger economically, this will help them to develop on their own the military strength. But this is a long-term prospect. In the next 20 years they will not have that capability, and they are
going to look closely at the US to see whether we have the power and leadership with the will to use it, not just in our own defense but also in defense of our friends and allies in the event that they become targets of Soviet aggression.
If the Chinese lose confidence in the US in this respect, no amount of trade or financial aid will keep the US-Chinese relationship viable. China then will have to revert to its historical pattern of accommodating its enemies and hoping to absorb them.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.155
Jan 1, 1981
On China Book:
Taiwan & PRC will bridge gaps; enforce Shanghai Communique
The Shanghai communique in 1972 [committed the US to use force in Taiwan if China invaded]. While China will predictably continue to press for bringing Taiwan under the central government in Peking, self-interest will strongly argue against any resort to
military action. Despite an enormous population advantage, crossing 100 miles of open sea and making an amphibious landing on Taiwan would be a formidable task for mainland Chinese.If the economic and political system of the People's Republic of
China continues to change, it is possible to imagine ways in which the mainland and Taiwan might--not soon but eventually--agree on some form of reunification.
As the differences between the two systems narrow, the bridge that has to be built between
them will become shorter. For now it is enough that the issue be postponed, with neither side accepting the status quo but with both sides living with it. Different conditions will eventually create a different situation.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.158-159
Jan 1, 1981
On Homeland Security:
Soviets disfavor ABM because of US technological superiority
In March 1969 the Sentinel ABM program, with its emphasis on light area defense, [was reoriented] to a new program, Safeguard, that emphasized defense of those threatened deterrent forces. The Soviet objective was clearly to continue launcher
construction and to limit the US ABM to as low levels as possible. The Soviets were interested in curtailing the US ABM, for the general reason that this was an area in which we had technological superiority, and for the specific reason that the ABM
would interfere with their counterforce doctrine, since its primary purpose was defense of Minuteman.
But we did eventually succeed in getting an interim 5-year agreement limiting offensive arms coupled with the ABM treaty. The US added to the
treaty: "If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within 5 years, US supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty."
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.181-183
Jan 1, 1981
On Homeland Security:
SALT: Negotiate from strength; require verifiability
Six indispensable conditions must be met before we make any further strategic arms agreements:- We must establish a strong position to negotiate from, and we must bear in mind that it is better to have no agreement than to have a bad agreement.
-
Any agreement e make with the Soviet Union must not inhibit us from assisting our NATO allies.
- Our dedication to strategic arms limitations must not leave the US with the sole option of killing millions od Russian civilians.
- Any SALT agreement must
be strictly verifiable by national means without the cooperation of the Soviet Union.
- Arms control must never be pursued as an end in itself, in isolation from other goals. There must be linkage between arms control and Soviet behavior.
- The SALT
process must not inhibit the US from going forward with strategic programs that are (a) allowed under the agreement, and (b) important for the achievement of a responsible American strategy.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.188-190
Jan 1, 1981
On Foreign Policy:
Japan needs to spend more on defense
Japan needs more defense, and it can afford it. The present constraints on defense spending are political and psychological, not economic. It may be unrealistic to expect a Japanese government in the immediate future to break through the traditional
1% of GNP barrier on defense expenditures. But even within that limit, expenditures can and should be raised, and Japan's leaders will have to work at preparing their people for a greater military effort. Meanwhile, Japan should compensate for its
virtually free ride on defense by shouldering a greater share of the free world's economic burden--in foreign aid, for example.The cornerstone of Japan's defense, however, will continue to be its alliance with the US. A close partnership between the
strongest military and economic power in the free world and the strongest economic power in Asia could provide the basis for American political and military flexibility in the region and act as a restraint on Soviet adventuring.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.207
Jan 1, 1981
On Foreign Policy:
Nixon Doctrine: sell arms to resist aggression abroad
If the Soviets have agitators and terrorists where we have no countervailing force, local defense forces are the ones best equipped to deal with these low-level threats, but if the aggressor is receiving aid from outside, those defending their freedom
must also have access to aid from outside.The Nixon Doctrine provided that the US would supply arms and assistance to nations threatened by aggression, IF they were willing to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower necessary
for their defense.
Some Americans have an almost theological aversion to having the US sells arms abroad. But those who argue against supplying our friends with the arms they need to defend themselves ignore one very important point. There is almost no
case on record since WWII in which arms provided by the US have been used by the country receiving them for purposes of aggression. Soviet arms are the ones that have been consistently used to break the peace.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.214
Jan 1, 1981
On Homeland Security:
Local force as important against USSR as strategic defense
More nuclear bombs, unquestioned military superiority, and massively superior economic strength will not deter revolutionary war, terrorism or other forms of communist aggression that fall short of conventional war. The US, our allies, and friends
must develop power commensurate with the power being used against us. It makes no sense to try to use a sledgehammer to kill a fly. That kind of enemy calls for a less powerful but more effective weapon--a fly swatter.In these situations it is not the
balance of power in the arsenal that counts, it is the balance of power on the battlefield. If we are relatively equal to the Soviet Union in nuclear arms but the Soviets have 5,000
Cubans, or even 500 agitators and terrorists, where we have no countervailing force, then the balance of power on the scene is massively on their side.
Source: The Real War, by Richard Nixon, p.214
Jan 1, 1981
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