Colin Powell in State of Denial, by Bob Woodward

On War & Peace: Overwhelming Force replaced by Rumsfeld’s “Less is More”

In Nov.’01, the Iraq war plan was the chessboard on which Rumsfeld would test, develop, expand and modify his ideas about military transformation. And the driving concept was “less is more”--a lighter, swifter, smaller force that could do the job better.

An important contrast to this process can be found in the war planning for the 1991 Gulf War. Powell, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, illustrates the difference. After Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1991, George H. W. Bush asked Powell how many troops it would take to provide an offensive option--the capacity to drive Saddam’s army out of Kuwait. The resulting concept was “Go in big, and end it quickly. We could not put the US through another Vietnam.” The plan to use overwhelming force to guarantee victory became known as the Powell Doctrine.

In 2001, the point of the Iraq war plan was: Get to Baghdad, and fast. It echoed Rumsfeld’s desire--“assume risk.” The Powell Doctrine of trying to guarantee success was out. Rapid, decisive warfare was in.

Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p. 81-83&100 Oct 1, 2006

On War & Peace: Pre-Iraq warnings to Bush about difficult post-war governing

On Jan. 13 2002, President Bush summoned Secretary of State Colin Powell for a 12-minute Oval Office meeting to say he had decided on war with Iraq.

“You’re sure?” asked Powell. Bush said he was. “You understand the consequences,” Powell offered in a half question. For nearly six months, Powell had been hammering on the theme of the complexity of governing Iraq after the war. “You know that you’re going to be owning this place?”

Bush said he realized that. “Are you with me on this?” Powell, “Time to put your war uniform on.”

The president very reluctantly confirmed to me that he had asked Powell directly for his support but added testily a rather obvious point. “I didn’t need his permission.”

Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p.106 Oct 1, 2006

On War & Peace: If we knew of no WMDs, war decision would've differed

Powell went to The Washington Post for an interview on February 2, 2004. He was asked what his position on the war would have been if he had known there were no stockpiles of WMD. "The absence of stockpiles changes the political calculus," Powell said. "It changes the answer you get." His remarks were the lead story in the next day, headlined: "Powell Says New Data May Have Affected War Decision."

Condi Rice called Powell. She and the president were "mad," she said. Powell had "given the Democrats a remarkable tool." His remarks were making headlines throughout the world. Bush's public position was that the jury was still out on WMD. So Powell had to go back out in public and retract his remarks, saying 5 times that the president's decision to go to war had been "right."

Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p.281 Oct 1, 2006

The above quotations are from State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III, by Bob Woodward. Click here for other excerpts from State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III, by Bob Woodward. Click here for other excerpts by Colin Powell. Click here for a profile of Colin Powell.
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