Dick Cheney in State of Denial, by Bob Woodward

On Principles & Values: OpEd: Used fear of terrorism successfully as a campaign tool

Bush had tapped into a new group of lower- and middle-class voters concerned about security. After 9/11, he believed, many more people were primarily worried about terrorism, afraid of the next attack.

In the campaign, the Bush reelection team had dramatically framed the issues to make the voters' fear of terrorism as palpable as possible. The starkest, most direct suggestion that reelecting Bush would save America but electing Kerry would lead to the country's utter demise had come from

Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p.353-4 Oct 1, 2006

On War & Peace: Post-9-11 philosophy: two-generation war starts with Iraq

On 11/29/2001, [a DOD appointed "think tank" group] distilled their thoughts into a 7-page document, called "Delta of terrorism." [It summarized that] "a war was going on within Islam--it was a deep problem, & 9/11 was not an isolated action that called for policing and crime fighting." Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where most of the hijackers came from, were the key, but the problems there are intractable. Iran is more important. But Saddam Hussein was different, weaker, more vulnerable. A confrontation with Saddam was inevitable. "We agreed that Saddam would have to leave the scene before the problem would be addressed." That was the only way to transform the region.

Copies of the memo, straight from the neoconservative playbook, pleased Cheney, and it had a strong impact on President Bush, causing him to focus on the "malignancy" of the Middle East. Rice found it "very, very persuasive." Summarizing their conclusions, DOD analysts said, "We're facing a 2-generation war. And start with Iraq."

Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p. 84-5 Oct 1, 2006

On War & Peace: Aug.’02: “No doubt” that Saddam had WMD (later proven wrong)

In the fall of 2002, Bush made it clear that war with Iraq was necessary and inevitable [in a conversation with CIA chief George Tenet]. Tenet said he found that there was a part of Bush that might still be deliberating while some others under him, like Cheney and Wolfowitz, had absolutely decided that war was coming.

Had Cheney told Bush, “Yes, you’ve got to do it?” Tenet had never been in the room when that happened, but he believed Cheney was privately pressuring Bush, arguing strongly for was as the only solution to the Saddam Hussein problem.

On Aug. 26, Cheney said in a public speech, “There is no doubt that Saddam now has WMD. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.”

In Jan. 2003, a White House spokesperson said, “We know for a fact that there are weapons there.” On Feb. 8, Bush said, “Saddam Hussein recently authorized the use of chemical weapons--the very weapons the dictator tells us he does not have.”

Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p. 89-92&139 Oct 1, 2006

On War & Peace: Pushed Saddam-al Qaeda connection but CIA & Powell disagreed

In Feb. 2003, Cheney was seized with what he thought was a connection between Saddam & al Qaeda, but the CIA disagreed. CIA chief George Tenet & his people had gone over the intelligence as completely as they could. There was no proof, Tenet said plainly True, the Saddam regime had given sanctuary to a Jordanian with al Qaeda ties. But there was no evidence to show that Saddam was involved. “I can’t take you to authority, direction & control,” Tenet said, the high standard that had to be met to make a case for a Saddam-al Qaeda link.

Powell was to make the WMD intelligence case for war to the UN. Cheney wanted him to look at the Saddam-al Qaeda link. Powell thought the link didn’t exist and he refused to include it in his speech.

After Powell’s UN speech, Cheney wanted to give his own speech making the charge [that Powell had omitted]. Tenet was upset. If Cheney gives the speech, Tenet told Bush, the CIA cannot and will not stand behind it. Bush backed Tenet and told Cheney not to give the speech.

Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p.120&135 Oct 1, 2006

On War & Peace: Mar.’03: “Greeted as liberators”; no need for 100,000 troops

[In Feb. 2003, Rumsfeld ordered that the author of the ‘Future of Iraq’ study, which analyzed the post-war risks, be taken] “off the Pentagon team. I’ve gotten this request from such a high level that I can’t turn it down,” Rumsfeld said. That could only mean Bush or conceivably Cheney.

The opposition to the study’s author was described as coming from “a group of about five people” in Cheney’s office--“a cabal”, one army colonel reported. Another Pentagon officer said, “it was the vice president” [who suppressed the dissenting discussion].

Three days before the start of the war, on March 16 2003, Cheney predicted, “My belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators.” The interviewer said that Congressional testimony indicated that the post-war phase would likely require more troops. “To suggest that we need several hundred thousand troops there after military operations cease, I don’t think that is accurate. I think that’s an overstatement,” Cheney said.

Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p.127-128&151 Oct 1, 2006

On War & Peace: Adopted Kissinger’s “Victory is the only exit strategy”

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had a powerful, largely invisible influence on the foreign policy of the Bush Administration. “Of the outside people that I talk to,” Cheney told me, “I probably talk to Henry Kissinger more than anybody else.” The president also met privately with Kissinger every couple of months, making him the most frequent outside adviser to Bush on foreign affairs.

Kissinger supported the Iraq war, but increasingly saw it through the prism of the Vietnam War. For Kissinger, the overriding lesson of Vietnam is to stick it out. He claimed that the US had essentially won the war in 1972, only to lose it because of the weakened resolve of the public and Congress. In The Washington Post on 8/12/05, Kissinger wrote, “ Victory over the insurgency is the only meaningful exit strategy.” [A few months later], the administration issued a “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.” It was right out of the Kissinger playbook. The only meaningful exit strategy would be victory.

Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p.406-8 Oct 1, 2006

The above quotations are from State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III, by Bob Woodward. Click here for other excerpts from State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III, by Bob Woodward. Click here for other excerpts by Dick Cheney. Click here for a profile of Dick Cheney.
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