State of Denial, by Bob Woodward: on War & Peace

Colin Powell: Overwhelming Force replaced by Rumsfeld’s “Less is More”

An important contrast to this process can be found in the war planning for the 1991 Gulf War. Powell, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, illustrates the difference. After Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1991, George H. W. Bush asked Powell how many troops it would take to provide an offensive option--the capacity to drive Saddam’s army out of Kuwait. The resulting concept was “Go in big, and end it quickly. We could not put the US through another Vietnam.” The plan to use overwhelming force to guarantee victory became known as the Powell Doctrine.

In 2001, the point of the Iraq war plan was: Get to Baghdad, and fast. It echoed Rumsfeld’s desire--“assume risk.” The Powell Doctrine of trying to guarantee success was out. Rapid, decisive warfare was in.

Colin Powell: Pre-Iraq warnings to Bush about difficult post-war governing

“You’re sure?” asked Powell. Bush said he was. “You understand the consequences,” Powell offered in a half question. For nearly six months, Powell had been hammering on the theme of the complexity of governing Iraq after the war. “You know that you’re going to be owning this place?”

Bush said he realized that. “Are you with me on this?” Powell, “Time to put your war uniform on.”

The president very reluctantly confirmed to me that he had asked Powell directly for his support but added testily a rather obvious point. “I didn’t need his permission.”

Colin Powell: If we knew of no WMDs, war decision would've differed

Condi Rice called Powell. She and the president were "mad," she said. Powell had "given the Democrats a remarkable tool." His remarks were making headlines throughout the world. Bush's public position was that the jury was still out on WMD. So Powell had to go back out in public and retract his remarks, saying 5 times that the president's decision to go to war had been "right."

Condoleezza Rice: Warned by CIA in July 2001 of major al-Qaeda attack soon

For months, Tenet had been pressing Rice to give the CIA stronger authority to conduct covert action against bin Laden. On June 30, a top-secret intelligence brief contained an article headlined “Bin Laden Threats Are Real.” Tenet hoped his abrupt request for an immediate meeting would shake Rice.

Tenet left the meeting feeling frustrated. Though Rice had given them a fair hearing, no immediate action meant great risk. The July 10 meeting went unmentioned in the various investigations into the Sept. 11 attacks, but it stood out in the mind of Tenet as the starkest warning on bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Tenet’s deputy later said, “The only thing we didn’t do was pull the trigger to the gun we were holding to her head.”

Condoleezza Rice: Wrote pre-9/11 plan to go after bin Laden; but not approved

Indeed, Tenet and Black had demanded action that day, but it was not clear what immediate action really would have meant. The strategic warning Tenet and Black gave lacked details: When? Where? How?

Besides, the planning for covert action to go after bin Laden in his sanctuary in Afghanistan actually did go forward at a pretty fast clip--quite fast for a national security bureaucracy, although the plan was not approved before the 9/11 attacks. In fact, Rice had a National Security Presidential Directive to launch a new covert war against bin Laden set to go to Bush on 9/10/2001. It was NSPD-9, meaning 8 other foreign policy matters had been formally debated, agreed on and signed by the president as administration policy before the plan to go after bin Laden.

Dick Cheney: Post-9-11 philosophy: two-generation war starts with Iraq

Copies of the memo, straight from the neoconservative playbook, pleased Cheney, and it had a strong impact on President Bush, causing him to focus on the "malignancy" of the Middle East. Rice found it "very, very persuasive." Summarizing their conclusions, DOD analysts said, "We're facing a 2-generation war. And start with Iraq."

Dick Cheney: Aug.’02: “No doubt” that Saddam had WMD (later proven wrong)

Had Cheney told Bush, “Yes, you’ve got to do it?” Tenet had never been in the room when that happened, but he believed Cheney was privately pressuring Bush, arguing strongly for was as the only solution to the Saddam Hussein problem.

On Aug. 26, Cheney said in a public speech, “There is no doubt that Saddam now has WMD. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.”

In Jan. 2003, a White House spokesperson said, “We know for a fact that there are weapons there.” On Feb. 8, Bush said, “Saddam Hussein recently authorized the use of chemical weapons--the very weapons the dictator tells us he does not have.”

Dick Cheney: Pushed Saddam-al Qaeda connection but CIA & Powell disagreed

Powell was to make the WMD intelligence case for war to the UN. Cheney wanted him to look at the Saddam-al Qaeda link. Powell thought the link didn’t exist and he refused to include it in his speech.

After Powell’s UN speech, Cheney wanted to give his own speech making the charge [that Powell had omitted]. Tenet was upset. If Cheney gives the speech, Tenet told Bush, the CIA cannot and will not stand behind it. Bush backed Tenet and told Cheney not to give the speech.

Dick Cheney: Mar.’03: “Greeted as liberators”; no need for 100,000 troops

The opposition to the study’s author was described as coming from “a group of about five people” in Cheney’s office--“a cabal”, one army colonel reported. Another Pentagon officer said, “it was the vice president” [who suppressed the dissenting discussion].

Three days before the start of the war, on March 16 2003, Cheney predicted, “My belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators.” The interviewer said that Congressional testimony indicated that the post-war phase would likely require more troops. “To suggest that we need several hundred thousand troops there after military operations cease, I don’t think that is accurate. I think that’s an overstatement,” Cheney said.

Dick Cheney: Adopted Kissinger’s “Victory is the only exit strategy”

Kissinger supported the Iraq war, but increasingly saw it through the prism of the Vietnam War. For Kissinger, the overriding lesson of Vietnam is to stick it out. He claimed that the US had essentially won the war in 1972, only to lose it because of the weakened resolve of the public and Congress. In The Washington Post on 8/12/05, Kissinger wrote, “ Victory over the insurgency is the only meaningful exit strategy.” [A few months later], the administration issued a “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.” It was right out of the Kissinger playbook. The only meaningful exit strategy would be victory.

Donald Rumsfeld: Afghanistan was CIA operation; Iraq was his operation

The CIA stepped in to fill the void. They could bring to bear all the resources of the intelligence community, combined with US military power and Special Forces, harness the factional opposition known as the Northern Alliance, defeat the Taliban and close out the al Qaeda sanctuary.

Rumsfeld sat uneasily on the sidelines. At an NSC meeting on October 16, his frustration boiled over. "This is CIA's strategy," he declared. "They developed the strategy. We're just executing the strategy." Rumsfeld had been humiliated. Never again. The next month, when the president ordered him to look seriously at the Iraq war plan, Rumsfeld made it his personal project. This would be his.

Donald Rumsfeld: Replaced Powell’s “Overwhelming Force” with “Less is More”

An important contrast can be found in the 1991 Gulf War. Powell’s concept was “Go in big & end it quickly. We could not put the US through another Vietnam.“ The plan to use overwhelming force to guarantee victory became known as the Powell Doctrine.

In 2001, things were different. The two great Pentagon ideas--a new, ”refreshed“ Iraq war plan, as Rumsfeld called it, and military transformation--converged.

The point of the Iraq war plan was: Get to Baghdad, and fast. It echoed Rumsfeld’s desire--”assume risk.“ The Powell Doctrine of trying to guarantee success was out. Rapid, decisive warfare was in.

Donald Rumsfeld: Briefed on risks & dangers before war; but shut down dissent

• “Current force packages are inadequate for the 1st step of securing all the major urban areas. We risk letting much of the country descend into civil unrest”
• “It seems likely we will begin military action before we know whether sufficient post-war funds will be available. We risk leaving behind a great unstable mess with potential to become a haven for terrorists.”
• “The ideas, as briefed, suggest a heavy-handed imperial take-over. Danger, danger!“

A level so high that the secretary of defense couldn’t turn it down? That could only mean Bush or conceivably Cheney.

Donald Rumsfeld: Infrastructure collapse was Saddam's fault, not U.S.

In an interview later, Rumsfeld said he realized that "the Iraqi infrastructure had been neglected for decades. I went over and looked at an electric power plant. I can remember, it was being held together with chewing gum, bobby pins and baling wire. And I looked at [it] myself and said, My Lord, this took 30 years to get there." Saddam had ruled for over 30 years. "It's going to take 30 years to get out of here, to get that--not us out--for them to get back to looking like Kuwait or Jordan or Saudi Arabia or Turkey or their neighbors. And I said, My goodness, that's going to be their job over a long period of time, because it just takes that long. You can't--and they have wealth. They've got water. They've got oil. They've got industrious people. They clearly are going to be the ones that are going to have to do that."

Donald Rumsfeld: Garner: key mistakes were disbanding army & deBaathification

“Really?” Rumsfeld asked.

“Three terrible mistakes,” Garner said. He cited the first order banning as many as 50,000 members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party from government jobs and the second order disbanding the Iraqi military. Now there were hundreds of thousands of disorganized, unemployed, armed Iraqis running around. Third, Garner said, was the summary dismissal of an interim Iraqi leadership group that had been eager to help the United States administer the country in the short term. Garner made his final point: “There’s still time to rectify this. There’s still time to turn it around.”

Rumsfeld looked at Garner for a moment with his take-no-prisoners gaze. “Well,” he said, “I don’t think there is anything we can do, because we are where we are.”

George Bush Sr.: 2002: Supported diplomacy in pre-war Iraq & didn't tell son

"Yes, I'm very worried."

"Do you think it's a mistake?"

"Yes, ma'am," Boren replied. "I think it's a huge mistake if we go in right now, this way."

"Well, his father is certainly worried and is losing sleep over it. He's up at night worried."

"Why doesn't he talk to him?"

"He doesn't think he should unless he's asked." It was the father-son distance, she said, and he didn't think he should volunteer.

"Well," Boren responded, "I understand the feeling of a father but he's a former president and an expert in this area."

Barbara shook her head solemnly, almost woefully.

Later, Boren greeted Bush senior. "Do you ever see our mutual friend, Colin?" the former president asked.

"Just sometimes."

"Be sure to tell him I sure think he's doing a good job."

Both men knew Powell was the reluctant warrior, trying to solve the Iraq problem with diplomacy.

George W. Bush: OpEd: Bush's lack of doubt meant more men fell for "honor"

Powell said he had the same question. If you don't have self doubt, Powell said, if you didn't get up in the morning wondering if you're doing a good job, you're not worth much.

But doubt never seeped into the president's public rhetoric. And as far as Powell's and Armitage's experience went, he was the same in private. "What the president says in effect is we've got to press on in honor of the memory of those who have fallen. Another way to say that is we've got to have more men fall to honor the memories of those who have already fallen."

I had explored the issue of doubt with Bush in several interviews. He volunteered the following: "I have not doubted what we're doing. There is no doubt in my mind we're doing the right thing."

George W. Bush: Decision to invade Iraq was certain by fall 2002

One CIA analyst asked Tenet if it really looked like war. “You bet,” Tenet said bluntly. “It’s not a matter of if. It’s a matter of when. This president is going to war. Make the plans. We’re going.”

Tenet didn’t think that invading Iraq was the right thing to do. But Tenet never conveyed these misgivings to the president. Bush had never asked him directly for his bottom-line counsel, although Tenet felt that Bush had nonetheless opened the door to the point where Tenet could have said, “No, we shouldn’t do this.” But Tenet never said it.

George W. Bush: 2002 NIE said Saddam making nukes by 2007; Bush said 2002

“You need to take this sentence out because we don’t believe it,” CIA Directot Geroge Tenet said to Bush’s aide. The speech was edited to say “Many people have asked how close Saddam is to developing a nuclear weapon. We don’t know exactly, and that’s the problem.“ It was a modest claim that accurately reflected the National Intelligence Estimate. The to psecret NIE said that ”Iraq does not have a nuclear weapon but is likely to have a weapon by 2007 to 2009.“

But instead of saying that a nuclear Iraq was 5 years off, Bush warned, ”Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof--the smoking gun--that would come in the form of a mushroom cloud.“

George W. Bush: Post-war planning began in Jan.'03, including governing

The presidential directive gave responsibility for all the tasks normally run by national, state and local governments in post-Saddam Iraq. The list included:
1. Assisting with humanitarian relief
2. Dismantling weapons of mass destruction
3. Defeating and exploiting terrorist networks
4. Protecting natural resources and infrastructure
5. Facilitating the country's reconstruction and protection of its infrastructure and economy
6. Assisting with the reestablishment of key civilian utilities
7. Reshaping the Iraqi military
8. Reshaping the other internal security institutions; and
9. Supporting the transition to Iraqi-led authority over time.

George W. Bush: Claimed 946 WMD sites “known”; none found

Then on May 29, Bush declared, “We have found the WMD. We found biological laboratories. They’re illegal. They’re against the UN resolutions, and we’ve so far discovered two. And we’ll find more weapons as time goes on. But for those who say we haven’t found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they’re wrong. We found them.“

Bush made similar remarks in other interviews. The only problem was that the weapons hadn’t actually been found. Despite a series of highly publicized false positives, each time the military found a smoking gun--an alleged stockpile, a vat or even a small vial of biological weapons--it would soon be discredited.

George W. Bush: Saudis recommended paying Iraq Army; Bush declined