Richard Nixon in Ten Commandments of Statecraft
On Foreign Policy:
Nixon’s Ten Commandments of Statecraft
A President needs a global view, a sense of proportion and a keen sense of the possible. If I could carve ten rules into the wall of the Oval Office for my successors in the dangerous years ahead, they would be these: - Always be prepared to
negotiate, but never negotiate without being prepared
- Never be belligerent, but always be firm
- Always remember that covenants should be openly agreed to but privately negotiated
- Never seek publicity that would destroy the ability to get results
- Never give up unilaterally what could be used as a bargaining chip
- Never let your adversary underestimate what you would do in response to a challenge
- Always leave your adversary a face-saving line of retreat
- Distinguish between friends who
provide some human rights and enemies who deny all human rights
- Do at least as much for our friends as our adversaries do for our enemies
- Never lose faith. Faith without strength is futile, but strength without faith is streile.
Source: Ten Commandments of Statecraft, by James Humes, p. 9-13
Jul 2, 1997
On Principles & Values:
Doggedly pursued Alger Hiss; made his name in House
Congressman Nixon’s capacity for drudge work--poring over hearings’ transcripts, checking out inconsistencies and re-interviewing witnesses privately--that led him to believe that Alger Hiss was lying. The Republican foreign policy adviser,
John Foster Dulles, told Nixon to drop the investigation ,as did his fellow Republican on the committee. Nixon, however, doggedly pressed on. As he told me once, “The replies of Hiss seemed too crafted and too cute.”
The fame Nixon garnered for his role in Hiss’ conviction for perjury led first to his Senate victory in 1950, and then to his selection as Eisenhower’s running mate in 1952.
Eisenhower saw Nixon as an internationalist with the anti-Communist credentials to appeal to the Taft wing of the Republican Party.
Source: Ten Commandments of Statecraft, by James Humes, p. 30
Jul 2, 1997
On Homeland Security:
Supported missile defense as means to achieve SALT
Nixon realized that to secure the SALT pact [Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty], the US had to deal from a position of strength. He had to make the Soviets eager to come to the bargaining table. Nixon the strategist wanted to have two cards to strengthen
his hand: the first, an ABM (anti-ballistic missile), to repel missile strikes; and second, rapprochement with mainland China. Almost all the leading experts recommended against these defense and foreign policy actions as “destabilizing.” Privately,
Nixon argued that more important than the fact that the ABM would deflect such a missile strike was that it possibly could. An avid poker player during his navy days, Nixon told his friends that it was like an ace showing on the table. The
irony inherent in the left’s attack of the ABM was that the Democrats opposed ABM because they believed it would not work, while the Russians opposed it because they believed it would.. The Kremlin feared the prowess of American technology.
Source: Ten Commandments of Statecraft, by James Humes, p. 37-38
Jul 2, 1997
On Foreign Policy:
Recommended quarantine of Cuba in 1960
When Vice President Nixon met Premier Fidel Castro during his 1st visit to the US in April, 1957, Nixon had written that Castro "was either incredibly na‹ve about Communism or under Communist discipline." Such a view was, at that time, opposed by the
Latin American bureau of the State Department. The official State Department line was to "try to get along with Castro and understand him."By early 1960, Nixon recommended economic, political, and diplomatic isolation of Cuba.
He added that "the time for patience was past," and that we should move vigorously in full association of our sister Latin American republics "to eradicate this cancer" in our hemisphere and "to prevent further Soviet penetration." "The Administration,"
said Nixon, was planning "a number of steps" and "will very promptly take the strongest possible economic measures to counter the economic banditry being practiced by this regime against our citizens."
Source: Ten Commandments of Statecraft, by James Humes, p. 76-7
Jul 2, 1997
On Principles & Values:
Conserve concessions; get something in exchange for each one
When Nixon was practicing law in the 1960s, he gave me this practical counsel concerning some negotiations in which O was involved:- Get something for every concession.
Don’t think you have to give tit for tat. Don’t feel you have to split 50-50. If he gives 60, give him 40.
- Make concessions that give nothing away.
- Conserve your concessions.
Source: Ten Commandments of Statecraft, by James Humes, p. 91
Jul 2, 1997
On Foreign Policy:
1972 "Triangularization": USSR vs. USA vs. mainland China
Nixon's strategy of "triangularization" was aimed at reshaping a bipolar world into a 3-sided one, led by the Soviet Union, the US, and mainland China. Before this could happen, Nixon needed to establish a diplomatic office in Beijing. Of course, he
could have followed the example of the British and French, who recognized Red China and abandoned the Nationalist Chinese government in Taiwan. But such a move would mean canceling our defense treaties with Taiwan and implicitly endorsing Red China's
claim to the island.
The genius of Nixon's negotiations enabled him to have his cake and eat it too. That is, he achieved "triangularization" without abandonment of US military support of Taiwan. With the carefully crafted phrases, "one China"
and "peaceful resolution," Nixon gained a liaison office in Beijing. George Bush would be the 1st liaison officer of that mission in Beijing. This access to the People's Republic was a success that exceeded Nixon's greatest hopes.
Source: Ten Commandments of Statecraft, by James Humes, p. 92-3
Jul 2, 1997
On War & Peace:
1968 vague plan to end war accepted by both hawks & doves
One factor that contributed to Nixon's victory in 1968 was that he had "a plan to end the war in Vietnam." Vaguely couched, the pledge could be accepted by both doves and hawks who could respectively interpret such a plan as either withdrawing US troops
or stepping up our involvement to achieve victory. Although Nixon's critics viewed the plan as a cynical campaign ploy, Nixon did have a plan--which he revealed only to intimates. It was to "Vietnamize" the war by gradually withdrawing US troops.
Nixon worked out a timetable for US withdrawal and entered into direct negotiations with the North Vietnamese on political and military issues.Since Ho Chi Minh believed that antiwar protests would force Nixon to pull out US troops unilaterally, he
was not interested in peace negotiations. To enter such talks would be to admit that the North Vietnam Army (NVA) was in South Vietnam, when they maintained the fiction that it was only the South Vietnamese people revolting against the Saigon government.
Source: Ten Commandments of Statecraft, by James Humes, p.107-8
Jul 2, 1997
On War & Peace:
North Vietnam refused to negotiate in 1968; willing in 1972
Since Ho Chi Minh believed that antiwar protests would force Nixon to pull out US troops unilaterally, he was not interested in peace negotiations [and hence turned down Nixon's offer to negotiate]. To enter such talks would be to admit that the North
Vietnam Army (NVA) was in South Vietnam, when they maintained the fiction that it was only the South Vietnamese people revolting against the Saigon government. But by the election year of 1972, North Vietnam was forced to reassess its opposition
to peace negotiations for three reasons.- Nixon's "triangular" diplomacy in quest of detente now meant that North Vietnam could no longer count on Beijing and Moscow for unqualified support.
- The South Vietnam army's mining of
Haiphong Harbor in the spring had halted the NVA offensive in its tracks. The south was reasserting itself.
- And the North Vietnamese could read the US polls, which indicated that Nixon would defeat McGovern by a landslide.
Source: Ten Commandments of Statecraft, by James Humes, p.108
Jul 2, 1997
On Foreign Policy:
1973: Egypt's Sadat represents future voice for moderation
The Israeli army had surrounded Egypt's 25,000-man Third Army Corps. Its demise would spell the destruction of Sadat. The Third Army was the pride of the Egyptian forces boasting the professional elite of their military. At the beginning of the invasion
on October 7, 1973, the Egyptian army had crossed the southern end of the Suez Canal and gained a foothold about 10 miles wide and 30 miles long in the Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula, which Egypt had lost to Israel in the 1967 war.
Nixon believed that Sadat represented a future voice for moderation and restraint in the volatile Middle East. He prevented Israel from annihilating Sadat's army in order to preserve his leadership and thus the hope of a constructive peace
settlement at a later time. For Sadat, the preservation of his army was a "face-saving line of retreat." But for the world, it was the foundation for the Egyptian-Israeli accord a few years later.
Source: Ten Commandments of Statecraft, by James Humes, p.123-5
Jul 2, 1997
On Foreign Policy:
Economic liberty mounts pressure to open up China
Nixon counseled that first, we should make a comparison between the leader of a friendly country and the alternative. Examples included South Vietnam and North Vietnam, South Korea and North Korea, Iran (under the Shah) and Iraq. Would Ho Chi Minh's
Communist regime be as "democratic" as the government of President Thieu, which tolerated free elections, religious freedom, and the right of opposition journals to operate? Would the North Korean psychopath Sung offer a more open society than President
Park?Second, Nixon was implicitly arguing that a free market economy, which both South Vietnam and South Korea were encouraging, was a basic freedom totalitarian Marxism did not recognize. It was Nixon's belief that economic liberty, even if under
autocratic governments, generated mounting pressure to open up society. In other words, if economic freedom comes, it is usually soon followed by political freedom. Nixon would cite Chile, Taiwan, and Singapore, as well as South Korea, as evidence.
Source: Ten Commandments of Statecraft, by James Humes, p.134
Jul 2, 1997
On War & Peace:
Full airlift to Israel during 1973 war
[After delays in supplying Israel in the Yom Kippur War in 1973], Nixon was especially angered when he learned that the 5 Phantom jets he had ordered sent to Israel 3 days earlier had not left America. "Do it now!" Nixon snapped at Kissinger.Nixon
ordered an immediate airlift. He said to stop worrying about the Soviets and Arabs. "We are going to get blamed just as much for 3 planes as 300." To Kissinger, Nixon said, "Use every one [plane] we have--everything that can fly."
The mammoth airlift
is an example of another Nixonian rule: "Sometimes leaders are hesitant about executing strong and controversial measures in the belief that a less than full-hearted operation mutes criticism. When you once decide," Nixon said to a group of us, "go with
all your might."
Nixon, against the recommendations of his cabinet, weighed in with all his might to aid Israel. Because of the airlift, Israel moved from the defensive to the offensive in its confrontation with the Syrians and Egyptians.
Source: Ten Commandments of Statecraft, by James Humes, p.153-4
Jul 2, 1997
On Principles & Values:
Presidents should avoid "never" and "always"
Having laid down these rules, I would also suggest that the President keep in his desk drawer, in mind but not out of sight, an 11th Commandment: When saying "always" and "never," always keep a mental reservation; never foreclose the unique exception;
always leave room for maneuver. A President always has yet to be prepared for what he thought he would never do.This "11th Commandment" is more of an addendum than an axiom. Nixon wrote it not so much as a rule but as an exception to the 10 rules.
Source: Ten Commandments of Statecraft, by James Humes, p.173
Jul 2, 1997
Page last updated: Feb 25, 2019