Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Labor & Farming
Employers must get employee agreement for comp time rules.
Justice Ginsburg joined the dissent on CHRISTENSEN v. HARRIS COUNTY on May 1, 2000:
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) permits States and their political subdivisions to compensate their employees for overtime work by granting them compensatory time in lieu of cash payment. If the employees do not use their accumulated compensatory time, the employer must pay cash compensation under certain circumstances. Fearing the consequences of having to pay for accrued compensatory time, Harris County adopted a policy requiring its employees to schedule time off in order to reduce the amount of accrued time. Petitioner Christensen sued, claiming that the FLSA does not permit an employer to compel an employee to use compensatory time in the absence of an agreement.
Held:
(Thomas, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and in part by Scalia)
Nothing in the FLSA or its implementing regulations prohibits a public employer from compelling the use of compensatory time. [Government agencies can require their
employees to take extra time off instead of seeking overtime pay. The justices voted 6-3 that public agencies can control when compensatory time is used, unless there is a pre-existing labor agreement.] Dissent:
(Stevens, joined by Ginsburg and Breyer)
In my judgment, the fact that no employer may lawfully make any use of “comp time” without a prior agreement with the affected employees is of critical importance. Because employees’ consent is a condition without which the employer cannot qualify for the exception from the general rule, it seems clear to me that their agreement must encompass the way in which the compensatory time may be used. Employers retain the ability to “cash out” of accrued leave at any time. That simple step is, after all, the method that the Department of Labor years ago suggested the county should pursue here, and that would achieve precisely the outcome the county has all along claimed it wants. I respectfully dissent.
Source: Supreme Court case 98-1167 argued on Feb 23, 2000