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Sonia Sotomayor on Government Reform
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AZ mail-in restrictions violate Voting Rights Act
Arizona voting restrictions challenged as violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. First, voters casting their votes on Election Day outside their precinct are not counted. Second, mail-in ballots cannot be collected by anyone other than an
election official, a mail carrier, or a voter's family or household member. The court held, 6-3, that these restrictions did not violate the Act nor were they racially discriminatory.Dissenters argued that the
Court's narrow reading weakened the law and disregarded its intent to address disparities in how election laws affect different racial groups. The rule discarding "out of precinct votes" impacted black and Hispanic voters, with Arizona
leading the country in discarding such votes. Restrictions on vote collection makes voting more difficult for Native Americans.
Elena Kagan wrote the dissent, joined by Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor.
Source: NPR commentary on 2021 SCOTUS rulings
, Jul 1, 2021
Allow curbside voting & loosen rules during pandemic
The U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision blocked a lower court ruling allowing curbside voting in Alabama and waiving some absentee ballot requirements during the COVID-19 pandemic. Conservative justices granted Alabama's request to stay a federal
judge's order that would allow local officials to offer curbside voting in the July runoff and loosen absentee ballot requirements in three of the state's large counties.The court rulings stem from a lawsuit filed by the NAACP, the Southern Poverty
Law Center and the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. A group of voters had sought more voting options because of health concerns.
A District Judge issued a preliminary injunction after finding that Alabama's election rules will cause sick
or elderly voters to "likely face a painful and difficult choice between exercising their fundamental right to vote and safeguarding their health, which could prevent them from casting a vote in upcoming elections." Alabama appealed the decision.
Source: Time magazine: Dissent on MERRILL v ALABAMA, No. 19A1063
, Jul 3, 2020
Voting Rights Act still needed to prevent discrimination
In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court struck down the section of the Voting Rights Act which established a formula for determining if a state requires prior approval before changing its voting laws. Nine states with a history of discrimination
must still get clearance from Congress before changing voting rules to make sure racial minorities are not negatively affected--this section was made toothless. Chief Justice Roberts said the formula Congress now uses, which was written in 1965, has
become outdated. Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, said, "Hubris is a fit word for today's demolition of the VRA."OnTheIssues explanation: This ruling led to a spate of "Voter ID" laws, which proponents claim is needed to protect the
integrity of the vote, and which opponents say discriminates against youth & minority voters.
Opinions:Majority: Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, & Alito; concurrence: Thomas; dissent: Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, & Kagan.
Source: InfoPlease.com on 2013 SCOTUS docket #12-96
, Jun 25, 2013
Barring felons from voting disqualifies race-based groups
In Hayden v. Pataki, 2006, the Second Circuit rejected a challenge under the Voting Rights Act to a New York law denying convicted felons the right to vote. The plaintiffs in the case had argued that in light of the long history of discrimination, both
in society & in the NY criminal justice system specifically, the state's disqualification of felons constituted disqualification based on race. The majority reasoned that Congress did not intend the VRA to apply to state felon disenfranchisement laws.
Sotomayor dissented from the court's decision, opining that the VRA "applies to all voting qualifications," and--in her view--the state law "disqualifies a group of people from voting." She emphasized that "even if
Congress had doubts about the wisdom of subjecting felony disenfranchisement laws to the results test, I trust that Congress would prefer to make any needed changes itself, rather than have courts do so for it."
Source: ScotusBlog.com, "Civil Litigation"
, Jul 25, 2009
The president can veto laws but not make them
If [a law says it's] authorized to let the president do something, then the president's acting at the height of his powers. If Congress has explicitly or implicitly prohibited something, then the president's acting at the lowest ebb of his powers.
In all of the situations, once you've looked at what Congress has done or not done, you then are directed to look at what the president's powers may be under the Constitution minus whatever powers Congress has in that area.
That's the basic structure of our system of government. That's why the Congress makes the law. The president can veto them, but he can't make them. He can regulate, if Congress gives him the authority to do so and within other delegated authorities.
I shouldn't use the word "delegated," because it has a legal meaning. But the point is that that question is always looked at in light of what Congress has said on the issue and in light of Congress's power, as specified in the Constitution.
Source: 2009 SCOTUS Confirmation Hearing, Senate Judiciary Committee
, Jul 14, 2009
Corporate speech can be restricted but not banned.
Justice Sotomayor joined the dissent on Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission on Jan 21, 2010:
Prior to the 2008 primary elections, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation dedicated to educating the American public about their rights and the government, produced a politically conservative 90-minute documentary entitled Hillary: The Movie. This documentary covers Hillary Clinton's record while in the Senate & the White House. However, The Movie falls within the definition of "electioneering communications" under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA")--a federal enactment designed to prevent "big money" from unfairly influencing federal elections--which, among other things, prohibits corporate financing of electioneering communications. The FEC [enforced the provision] of BCRA prohibiting corporations from broadcasting electioneering communications within 60 days of a general election. [The Supreme Court rules that this] violates the free speech clause of the First Amendment.
Justice Kennedy , Opinion of the Court (Roberts, Scalia, Alito, and
Thomas concurring):
Some members of the public might consider "Hillary: The Movie" to be insightful and instructive; some might find it to be neither high art nor a fair discussion on how to set the Nation's course; still others simply might suspend judgment on these points but decide to think more about issues and candidates. Those choices and assessments, however, are not for the Government to make.
Justice Stevens (dissent joined by Ginsburg , Breyer, and Sotomayor)
Neither Citizens United's nor any other corporation's speech has been "banned." All that the parties dispute is whether Citizens United had a right to use the funds in its general treasury to pay for broadcasts during the 30-day period. The notion that the First Amendment [allows that] is, in my judgment, profoundly misguided. Although I concur in the Court's decision to sustain BCRA's disclosure provisions, I emphatically dissent from its principal holding.
Source: Supreme Court case 08_CU_FEC argued on Mar 24, 2009
Public campaign finance can fund based on opponent spending.
Justice Sotomayor joined the dissent on AZ FREEDOM CLUB PAC v. BENNETT on Jun 27, 2011:
An Arizona public campaign financing law allowed a person who agreed to the restrictions of a publicly financed campaign to receive an initial allotment from the state. That initial allotment was increased when the spending of a privately financed opponent together with the spending of any independent group exceeded that initial allotment. The public funds to match opponent expenditures topped out at two times the initial allotment.
HELD: Delivered by Roberts; joined by Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito
Arizona's public financing law places a burden on privately financed candidates. If privately financed candidates spend money above a certain level, they necessarily entitle their publicly financed opponents to greater funding. Their First Amendment right to free speech in a political matter--which includes spending money on their campaigns--is inhibited. Independent groups do not qualify for public financing at all, but their spending still may lead to a funding
increase for the candidates the independent groups oppose. Leveling the playing is not a compelling state interest justifying a burden on a First Amendment right, nor is combating corruption. Arizona would be free to give the maximum amount to all public candidates, but that does not justify inhibiting the free speech of candidates and independent groups.DISSENT: Kagan dissents; joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor
The First Amendment's core purpose is to foster a political system full of robust discussion and debate. Arizona's public campaign finance did not restrict speech, it increased speech through public subsidy with the goal of decreasing the corruption of both quid pro quo campaign payments made in exchange for official acts or an office seeker feeling beholden to his great financial supporters. Any burden on free speech, the burden could hardly be more substantial than what the Court announces would be legal: a larger, up-front allotment to a public candida
Source: Supreme Court case 11-AZ-PAC argued on Mar 28, 2011
Page last updated: Mar 21, 2022