Rob Andrews on Free Trade Democratic Representative (NJ-1)

Voted NO on promoting free trade with Peru.

• enforcement of textile and apparel rules of origin;
• certain textile and apparel safeguard measures; and
• enforcement of export laws governing trade of timber products from Peru.

Proponents support voting YES because:

Rep. RANGEL: It's absolutely ridiculous to believe that we can create jobs without trade. I had the opportunity to travel to Peru recently. I saw firsthand how important this agreement is to Peru and how this agreement will strengthen an important ally of ours in that region. Peru is resisting the efforts of Venezuela's authoritarian President Hugo Chavez to wage a war of words and ideas in Latin America against the US. Congress should acknowledge the support of the people of Peru and pass this legislation by a strong margin.

Opponents recommend voting NO because:

Rep. WU: I regret that I cannot vote for this bill tonight because it does not put human rights on an equal footing with environmental and labor protections.

Rep. KILDEE: All trade agreements suffer from the same fundamental flaw: They are not self-enforcing. Trade agreements depend upon vigorous enforcement, which requires official complaints be made when violations occur. I have no faith in President Bush to show any enthusiasm to enforce this agreement. Congress should not hand this administration yet another trade agreement because past agreements have been more efficient at exporting jobs than goods and services. I appeal to all Members of Congress to vote NO on this. But I appeal especially to my fellow Democrats not to turn their backs on those American workers who suffer from the export of their jobs. They want a paycheck, not an unemployment check.

Voted YES on assisting workers who lose jobs due to globalization.

Proponents support voting YES because:

Rep. RANGEL: In recent years, trade policy has been a dividing force. This legislation develops a new trade policy that more adequately addresses the growing perception that trade is not working for American workers. The Trade and Globalization Assistance Act would expand training and benefits for workers while also helping to encourage investment in communities that have lost jobs to increased trade--particularly in our manufacturing sector. The bill is a comprehensive policy expanding opportunities for American workers, industries, and communities to prepare for and overcome the challenges created by expanded trade.

Opponents recommend voting NO because:

Rep. McCRERY: We should be considering trade adjustment assistance in the context of trade opportunities generally for US workers. That is to say, I think we should be considering modifications to our assistance network in the context of the pending free trade agreements that are before the Congress. Unfortunately, we are not doing that. We are considering TAA in isolation. [We should instead] restructure TAA from a predominantly income support program into a job retraining program. Other problems include that H.R. 3920 would:

• pointlessly keep people in trade adjustment assistance longer.
• increase TAA spending by billions of dollars, but would not require any further accountability on how program funds are spent.
• greatly expand TAA and exacerbate the inefficiencies in the program today.
• extend benefits to public sector workers and submit State and local officials to subpoenas and legal proceedings to comply.

Voted NO on implementing CAFTA, Central America Free Trade.

• Progressively eliminate customs duties on all originating goods traded among the participating nations
• Preserve U.S. duties on imports of sugar goods over a certain quota
• Remove duties on textile and apparel goods traded among participating nations
• Prohibit export subsidies for agricultural goods traded among participating nations
• Provide for cooperation among participating nations on customs laws and import licensing procedures
• Encourage each participating nation to adopt and enforce laws ensuring high levels of sanitation and environmental protection
• Recommend that each participating nation uphold the International Labor Organization Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
• Urge each participating nation to obey various international agreements regarding intellectual property rights

Voted NO on implementing US-Australia Free Trade Agreement.

Voted NO on implementing US-Singapore free trade agreement.

Voted NO on implementing free trade agreement with Chile.

Voted NO on withdrawing from the WTO.

Voted NO on 'Fast Track' authority for trade agreements.

Rated 39% by CATO, indicating a mixed record on trade issues.

The mission of the Cato Institute Center for Trade Policy Studies is to increase public understanding of the benefits of free trade and the costs of protectionism.

The Cato Trade Center focuses not only on U.S. protectionism, but also on trade barriers around the world. Cato scholars examine how the negotiation of multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements can reduce trade barriers and provide institutional support for open markets. Not all trade agreements, however, lead to genuine liberalization. In this regard, Trade Center studies scrutinize whether purportedly market-opening accords actually seek to dictate marketplace results, or increase bureaucratic interference in the economy as a condition of market access.

Studies by Cato Trade Center scholars show that the United States is most effective in encouraging open markets abroad when it leads by example. The relative openness and consequent strength of the U.S. economy already lend powerful support to the worldwide trend toward embracing open markets. Consistent adherence by the United States to free trade principles would give this trend even greater momentum. Thus, Cato scholars have found that unilateral liberalization supports rather than undermines productive trade negotiations.

Scholars at the Cato Trade Center aim at nothing less than changing the terms of the trade policy debate: away from the current mercantilist preoccupation with trade balances, and toward a recognition that open markets are their own reward.

The following ratings are based on the votes the organization considered most important; the numbers reflect the percentage of time the representative voted the organization's preferred position.

Extend trade restrictions on Burma to promote democracy.

A joint resolution approving the renewal of import restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003. The original act sanctioned the ruling military junta, and recognized the National League of Democracy as the legitimate representative of the Burmese people.

Legislative Outcome: Related bills: H.J.RES.44, H.J.RES.93, S.J.RES.41; became Public Law 110-52.

Tariffs against countries undervaluing their currency.

Amends the Tariff Act of 1930 to require the administering authority to determine, based on certain requirements, whether the exchange rate of the currency of an exporting country is undervalued or overvalued (misaligned) against the U.S. dollar for an 18-month period; and to take certain actions under a countervailing duty or antidumping duty proceeding to offset such misalignment in cases of an affirmative determination. Congress makes the following findings:
1. The strength, vitality, and stability of the US economy and the openness and effectiveness of the global trading system are critically dependent upon an international monetary regime of orderly and flexible exchange rates.
2. Increasingly in recent years, a number of foreign governments have undervalued their currencies by means of protracted, large-scale intervention in foreign exchange markets, and this fundamental misalignment has substantially contributed to distortions in trade flows.
3. This exchange depreciation serves as a subsidy for, and facilitates dumping of, exports from countries that engage in this mercantilist practice.
4. It is consistent with the agreements of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund that US trade law make explicit that fundamental undervaluation by an exporting country of its currency is actionable as a countervailable export subsidy and alternatively can be offset by antidumping duties.

Review free trade agreements biennially for rights violation.

Trade Reform, Accountability, Development, and Employment Act or the TRADE Act:
1. review biennially certain free trade agreements (including Uruguay Round Agreements) between the US and foreign countries to evaluate their economic, environmental, national security, health, safety, and other effects; and
2. report on them to the Congressional Trade Agreement Review Committee (established by this Act), including analyses of specified aspects of each agreement and certain information about agreement parties, such as whether the country has a democratic form of government, respects certain core labor rights and fundamental human rights, protects intellectual property rights, and enforces environmental laws.

Declares that implementing bills of new trade agreements shall not be subject to expedited consideration or special procedures limiting amendment, unless such agreements include certain standards with respect to:
1. labor;
2. human rights;
3. environment and public safety;
4. food and product health and safety;
5. provision of services;
6. investment;
7. procurement;
8. intellectual property;
9. agriculture;
10. trade remedies and safeguards;
11. dispute resolution and enforcement;
12. technical assistance;
13. national security; and
14. taxation.

Impose tariffs against countries which manipulate currency.

• Amends the Tariff Act of 1930 to include as a "countervailable subsidy" requiring action under a countervailing duty or antidumping duty proceeding the benefit conferred on merchandise imported into the US from foreign countries with fundamentally undervalued currency.
• Defines "benefit conferred" as the difference between:
  1. the amount of currency provided by a foreign country in which the subject merchandise is produced; and
  2. the amount of currency such country would have provided if the real effective exchange rate of its currency were not fundamentally undervalued.
• Determines that the currency of a foreign country is fundamentally undervalued if for an 18-month period:
  1. the government of the country engages in protracted, large-scale intervention in one or more foreign exchange markets
  2. the country's real effective exchange rate is undervalued by at least 5%
  3. the country has experienced significant and persistent global current account surpluses; and
  4. the country's government has foreign asset reserves exceeding the amount necessary to repay all its debt obligations.

[Explanatory note from Wikipedia.com "Exchange Rate"]:

Between 1994 and 2005, the Chinese yuan renminbi was pegged to the US dollar at RMB 8.28 to $1. Countries may gain an advantage in international trade if they manipulate the value of their currency by artificially keeping its value low. It is argued that China has succeeded in doing this over a long period of time. However, a 2005 appreciation of the Yuan by 22% was followed by a 39% increase in Chinese imports to the US. In 2010, other nations, including Japan & Brazil, attempted to devalue their currency in the hopes of subsidizing cheap exports and bolstering their ailing economies. A low exchange rate lowers the price of a country's goods for consumers in other countries but raises the price of imported goods for consumers in the manipulating country.

Require open markets for US goods in all trade agreements.

Reciprocal Market Access Act of 2011: Prohibits the President from agreeing to the reduction or elimination of the existing rate of duty on any product in order to carry out a foreign trade agreement until the President certifies to Congress that the US has obtained the reduction or elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers and policies and practices of such foreign country with respect to US exports of any product that has the same physical characteristics and uses as the product for which the President seeks to modify its rate of duty.

Congress finds the following:
1. One of the fundamental tenets of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is reciprocal market access.
2. The American people have a right to expect that the promises that trade negotiators and policy makers offer in terms of the market access opportunities that will be available to United States businesses and their employees if trade agreements are reached, will, in fact, be realized.
3. With each subsequent round of bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade negotiations, tariffs have been significantly reduced or eliminated for many manufactured goods, leaving nontariff barriers as the most pervasive, significant, and challenging barriers to US exports and market opportunities
4. The US market is widely recognized as one of the most open markets in the world.
5. Often the only leverage the US has to obtain the reduction or elimination of nontariff barriers imposed by foreign countries is to negotiate the amount of tariffs the US imposes on imports from those foreign countries.
6. The purpose of this Act is to require that trade negotiations achieve measurable results for US businesses by ensuring that trade agreements result in expanded market access for United States exports and not solely the elimination of tariffs on goods imported into the US.

Sponsored sugar quotas & import tariffs to stabilize prices.

Congressional Summary:Sugar Reform Act:

• Requires that sugar allotments be appropriate to maintain adequate supplies at reasonable prices, taking into account all domestic supply sources, including imports.
• Revises sugar tariff-rate quota adjustment provisions so that the ratio of sugar stocks to total sugar use at the end of the quota year will be approximately 15.5%
• Extends flexible marketing sugar allotment authority through crop year 2017
• Repeals the feedstock flexibility program for bioenergy producers.

Proponent's argument for bill:(Senators' opinions reported on politico.com) "We subsidize a handful of wealthy sugar growers at the expense of everybody in America," said Sen. Patrick Toomey (R-Pa.), whose home state boasts the chocolate giant, Hershey's. Sen. Heidi Heitkamp (D-N.D.), warned her colleagues against unraveling the commodity coalition behind the farm bill: "We forget that this is much bigger than a sugar program. It's much bigger than any one single commodity. When you single out one commodity, you threaten the effectiveness of the overall farm bill."

Opponent's argument against bill:(Food and Business News, May 2013): Users claim the sugar program nearly doubles the price of sugar to US consumers and has resulted in lost jobs as some candy manufacturers have moved operations to other countries. Producers claim the program has resulted in more stable sugar supplies, provides a safety net for growers and that world prices are often lower because of subsidies in origin countries, which would put US growers at a disadvantage should import restrictions be lifted. Producers also note that US sugar prices have declined more than 50% from late 2011 highs. They also maintain that jobs have been lost or moved out of the US for reasons other than sugar prices, mainly labor and health care costs, noting that candy makers' profits have been strong in recent years.

Rated 38% by the USAE, indicating support for trade sanctions.

Ratings by USA*Engage indicate support for trade engagement or trade sanctions. The organization's self-description: "USA*Engage is concerned about the proliferation of unilateral foreign policy sanctions at the federal, state and local level. Despite the fact that broad trade-based unilateral sanctions rarely achieve our foreign policy goals, they continue to have political appeal. Unilateral sanctions give the impression that the United States is 'doing something,' while American workers, farmers and businesses absorb the costs."

USA*Engage at Work
• Developing the Case: USA*Engage explains the benefits of economic engagement, and the high cost of sanctions for American exports, investment and jobs.
• Education: We recruit respected foreign policy and economic experts to speak out against sanctions, actively engage the media and provide outreach to key target states and Congressional districts.
• Contacting Government Officials: USA*Engage directly contacts Congressional, Administration, state and local officials.

VoteMatch scoring for the USA*Engage ratings is as follows :

• 0%-49%: supports trade sanctions;
• 50%-74%: mixed record on trade engagement;
• 75%-100%: supports trade engagement.