Steven Rothman on Free Trade Democratic Representative (NJ-9)

Voted YES on assisting workers who lose jobs due to globalization.

Proponents support voting YES because:

Rep. RANGEL: In recent years, trade policy has been a dividing force. This legislation develops a new trade policy that more adequately addresses the growing perception that trade is not working for American workers. The Trade and Globalization Assistance Act would expand training and benefits for workers while also helping to encourage investment in communities that have lost jobs to increased trade--particularly in our manufacturing sector. The bill is a comprehensive policy expanding opportunities for American workers, industries, and communities to prepare for and overcome the challenges created by expanded trade.

Opponents recommend voting NO because:

Rep. McCRERY: We should be considering trade adjustment assistance in the context of trade opportunities generally for US workers. That is to say, I think we should be considering modifications to our assistance network in the context of the pending free trade agreements that are before the Congress. Unfortunately, we are not doing that. We are considering TAA in isolation. [We should instead] restructure TAA from a predominantly income support program into a job retraining program. Other problems include that H.R. 3920 would:

• pointlessly keep people in trade adjustment assistance longer.
• increase TAA spending by billions of dollars, but would not require any further accountability on how program funds are spent.
• greatly expand TAA and exacerbate the inefficiencies in the program today.
• extend benefits to public sector workers and submit State and local officials to subpoenas and legal proceedings to comply.

Voted NO on implementing CAFTA, Central America Free Trade.

• Progressively eliminate customs duties on all originating goods traded among the participating nations
• Preserve U.S. duties on imports of sugar goods over a certain quota
• Remove duties on textile and apparel goods traded among participating nations
• Prohibit export subsidies for agricultural goods traded among participating nations
• Provide for cooperation among participating nations on customs laws and import licensing procedures
• Encourage each participating nation to adopt and enforce laws ensuring high levels of sanitation and environmental protection
• Recommend that each participating nation uphold the International Labor Organization Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
• Urge each participating nation to obey various international agreements regarding intellectual property rights

Voted NO on implementing US-Australia Free Trade Agreement.

Voted NO on implementing US-Singapore free trade agreement.

Voted NO on implementing free trade agreement with Chile.

Voted NO on withdrawing from the WTO.

Voted NO on 'Fast Track' authority for trade agreements.

Rated 22% by CATO, indicating a pro-fair trade voting record.

The mission of the Cato Institute Center for Trade Policy Studies is to increase public understanding of the benefits of free trade and the costs of protectionism.

The Cato Trade Center focuses not only on U.S. protectionism, but also on trade barriers around the world. Cato scholars examine how the negotiation of multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements can reduce trade barriers and provide institutional support for open markets. Not all trade agreements, however, lead to genuine liberalization. In this regard, Trade Center studies scrutinize whether purportedly market-opening accords actually seek to dictate marketplace results, or increase bureaucratic interference in the economy as a condition of market access.

Studies by Cato Trade Center scholars show that the United States is most effective in encouraging open markets abroad when it leads by example. The relative openness and consequent strength of the U.S. economy already lend powerful support to the worldwide trend toward embracing open markets. Consistent adherence by the United States to free trade principles would give this trend even greater momentum. Thus, Cato scholars have found that unilateral liberalization supports rather than undermines productive trade negotiations.

Scholars at the Cato Trade Center aim at nothing less than changing the terms of the trade policy debate: away from the current mercantilist preoccupation with trade balances, and toward a recognition that open markets are their own reward.

The following ratings are based on the votes the organization considered most important; the numbers reflect the percentage of time the representative voted the organization's preferred position.

Review free trade agreements biennially for rights violation.

Trade Reform, Accountability, Development, and Employment Act or the TRADE Act:
1. review biennially certain free trade agreements (including Uruguay Round Agreements) between the US and foreign countries to evaluate their economic, environmental, national security, health, safety, and other effects; and
2. report on them to the Congressional Trade Agreement Review Committee (established by this Act), including analyses of specified aspects of each agreement and certain information about agreement parties, such as whether the country has a democratic form of government, respects certain core labor rights and fundamental human rights, protects intellectual property rights, and enforces environmental laws.

Declares that implementing bills of new trade agreements shall not be subject to expedited consideration or special procedures limiting amendment, unless such agreements include certain standards with respect to:
1. labor;
2. human rights;
3. environment and public safety;
4. food and product health and safety;
5. provision of services;
6. investment;
7. procurement;
8. intellectual property;
9. agriculture;
10. trade remedies and safeguards;
11. dispute resolution and enforcement;
12. technical assistance;
13. national security; and
14. taxation.

Impose tariffs against countries which manipulate currency.

• Amends the Tariff Act of 1930 to include as a "countervailable subsidy" requiring action under a countervailing duty or antidumping duty proceeding the benefit conferred on merchandise imported into the US from foreign countries with fundamentally undervalued currency.
• Defines "benefit conferred" as the difference between:
  1. the amount of currency provided by a foreign country in which the subject merchandise is produced; and
  2. the amount of currency such country would have provided if the real effective exchange rate of its currency were not fundamentally undervalued.
• Determines that the currency of a foreign country is fundamentally undervalued if for an 18-month period:
  1. the government of the country engages in protracted, large-scale intervention in one or more foreign exchange markets
  2. the country's real effective exchange rate is undervalued by at least 5%
  3. the country has experienced significant and persistent global current account surpluses; and
  4. the country's government has foreign asset reserves exceeding the amount necessary to repay all its debt obligations.

[Explanatory note from Wikipedia.com "Exchange Rate"]:

Between 1994 and 2005, the Chinese yuan renminbi was pegged to the US dollar at RMB 8.28 to $1. Countries may gain an advantage in international trade if they manipulate the value of their currency by artificially keeping its value low. It is argued that China has succeeded in doing this over a long period of time. However, a 2005 appreciation of the Yuan by 22% was followed by a 39% increase in Chinese imports to the US. In 2010, other nations, including Japan & Brazil, attempted to devalue their currency in the hopes of subsidizing cheap exports and bolstering their ailing economies. A low exchange rate lowers the price of a country's goods for consumers in other countries but raises the price of imported goods for consumers in the manipulating country.

Require open markets for US goods in all trade agreements.

Reciprocal Market Access Act of 2011: Prohibits the President from agreeing to the reduction or elimination of the existing rate of duty on any product in order to carry out a foreign trade agreement until the President certifies to Congress that the US has obtained the reduction or elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers and policies and practices of such foreign country with respect to US exports of any product that has the same physical characteristics and uses as the product for which the President seeks to modify its rate of duty.

Congress finds the following:
1. One of the fundamental tenets of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is reciprocal market access.
2. The American people have a right to expect that the promises that trade negotiators and policy makers offer in terms of the market access opportunities that will be available to United States businesses and their employees if trade agreements are reached, will, in fact, be realized.
3. With each subsequent round of bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade negotiations, tariffs have been significantly reduced or eliminated for many manufactured goods, leaving nontariff barriers as the most pervasive, significant, and challenging barriers to US exports and market opportunities
4. The US market is widely recognized as one of the most open markets in the world.
5. Often the only leverage the US has to obtain the reduction or elimination of nontariff barriers imposed by foreign countries is to negotiate the amount of tariffs the US imposes on imports from those foreign countries.
6. The purpose of this Act is to require that trade negotiations achieve measurable results for US businesses by ensuring that trade agreements result in expanded market access for United States exports and not solely the elimination of tariffs on goods imported into the US.