Colin Powell on War & Peace Secretary of State (Pres. Bush Cabinet)

Sub-sections under War & Peace:
• Iraq
• Kuwait
• Other issues under War & Peace

Iran working on delivery systems as well as nukes

I was delighted. 1st, I hadn't done it. 2nd, I thought this was exactly the kind of intelligence we needed out in public.

Politicians' sons in Guard is raw class discrimination

Arafat must end terrorism to get to two-state solution

“I had warned Arafat twice that it was about to come to an end, that I could no longer deal with him if he didn’t do something about terrorism,” Powell said. “And he didn’t, so we then came up with this twenty-fourth June speech that said we can’t work with this guy; the Palestinian Authority has to reform itself, and that has to be done quickly; and we’ll wait for a new Palestinian Authority leadership to emerge, and we are looking for a Palestinian state, a two-state solution.”

We wrote Resolution 1441 to preserve peace

US need not choose between Israel & Arabs

He also talked about going to Israel and feeling so comfortable he could speak to his Israeli counterparts in “short-hand, the kind that develops among close and dear friends.” He traced this relationship to the basis of the alliance’s “democratic cooperation...a cooperation based on rules of law and democracy.”

US has always stood with Israel; and will continue to do so

Those were his most extensive public remarks on the Middle East. As Joint Chiefs chairman, Powell had a role in the growth of strategic cooperation between the United States and Israel, but he was not a catalyst.

Personally oversaw Panama invasion in 1989

Powell monitored the situation closely, and when the time was right, on December 29, 1989, some 26,000 troops invaded Central America, ousting Panama's dictator, Manuel Noriega. The operation was an enormous success. Noriega was quickly captured and brought to Florida for trial. He was subsequently convicted and sentenced to prison. On January 4, Powell went to Panama to bring the US troops home. He wanted to be a hands-on leader.

In under 90 days, Powell had become a popular hero.

Lebanon: providing “presence” not sufficient basis

I was developing a strong distaste for the antiseptic phrases coined by State Department officials for foreign interventions which usually had bloody consequences for the military, words like “presence,” “symbol,” “signal.” Their use is fine if beneath them lay a solid mission. But too often these words were used to give the appearance of clarity to mud.

I saw America sticking its hand into a thousand-year-old hornet’s nest with the expectation that our mere presence might pacify the hornets. There are times when American lives must be risked and lost. But lives must not be risked until we can face a parent or spouse with a clear answer to the question of why. To provide a “symbol” or a “presence” is not good enough.

War cabinet split: Rumsfeld & Cheney hawks; Powell dove

One of Powell’s greatest difficulties was that he was more or less supposed to pretend in public that the sharp differences in the war cabinet did not exist. The president would not tolerate public discord. Powell was also held in check by his own code -- a soldier obeys.

Bush might order, Go get the guns! Get my horses! -- all the Texas, Alamo macho that made Powell uncomfortable. But he believed and hoped that the president knew better, that he would see the go-it-alone approach did not stand further analysis.

The ghosts in the machine in Powell’s view were Rumsfeld and Cheney. Too often they went for the guns and the horses.

When I hear “limited” & “surgical”, I head for the bunker

2001: Counseled against Iraq at same time as Afghanistan

Colin cautioned against it. "Going after Iraq now would be viewed as a bai and switch," he said. "We would lose the UN, the Islamic countries, and NATO. If we want to do Iraq, we should do it at a time of our choosing. But we should not do it now, because we don't have linkage to this event."

Dick Cheney understood the threat of Saddam Hussein and believed we had to address it. "But now is not a good time to do it," he said. "We would lose our momentum. Right now people have to choose between the US and the bad guys."

Unless I received definitive evidence tying Saddam Hussein to the 9/11 plot, I would work to resolve the Iraq problem diplomatically. I hoped unified pressure by the world might compel Saddam to meet his international obligations. The best way to show him we were serious was to succeed in Afghanistan.

Pre-9-11 goal: Keep Saddam in his box

• Saddam didn't just sympathize with terrorists. He had paid the families of Palestinian suicide bombers.
• Saddam wasn't just a sworn enemy of America. He had fired at our aircraft, issues a statement praising 9/11, and made an assassination attempt on a former president, my father.
• Saddam didn't just threaten his neighbors. He had invaded two of them, Iran in the 1980s and Kuwait in the 1990s.

2003 UN speech focused on a call for resolve on Iraq

Powell's speech perfectly captured our thinking. We wanted to increase pressure on Saddam Hussein, which would, we hoped, cause him to change his ways, to comply with U.N. demands and live up to his obligations.

Iraq Security Council speech is "worst blot" on my record

OpEd: will be remembered for speech to UN on WMD in Iraq

2004: We don't have enough troops in Iraq

"We can say with reasonable confidence that the notion of hundreds of thousands of American troops is way off the mark."
--Paul Wolfowitz, Feb. 27, 2003

"The idea that it would take several hundred thousand US forces I think is far off the mark."
-- Donald Rumsfeld, Feb. 28, 2003

"We don't have enough troops. We don't control the terrain."
--Colin Powell, to George W. Bush and Tony Blair, Nov. 12, 2004

"In my weeks in Iraq, I did not meet a single military officer who felt, privately, that we had enough troops."
--Coalition Provisional Authority adviser Larry Diamond, in a memo to Condoleezza Rice, April 26, 2004

2001: Saddam has not developed WMD capability

2005: UN speech on Iraqi WMDs is a blot on my record

Omitted shaky Niger uranium claim from 2003 UN speech

Just as American was on the verge of war, the Niger claim was seriously undermined. The IAEA made a startling statement: there was "no evidence or plausible indication" that Iraq had revived a nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, the documents on which the Niger claim had been based were forgeries.

Only major adviser to Bush to question Iraq war

Though no one has a crystal ball, it's not asking too much that a well-considered understanding of Iraq and the Middle East should have been brought into the decision-making process. The responsibility to provide this understanding belonged to the president's advisers, and they failed to fulfill it. Secretary of State Colin Powell was apparently the only adviser who even tried to raise doubts about the wisdom of war. The rest of the foreign policy team seemed to be preoccupied with the regime change or, in the case of Condi Rice, seemingly more interested in accommodating the president's instincts and ideas than in questioning them or educating him.

Overwhelming Force replaced by Rumsfeld’s “Less is More”

An important contrast to this process can be found in the war planning for the 1991 Gulf War. Powell, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, illustrates the difference. After Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1991, George H. W. Bush asked Powell how many troops it would take to provide an offensive option--the capacity to drive Saddam’s army out of Kuwait. The resulting concept was “Go in big, and end it quickly. We could not put the US through another Vietnam.” The plan to use overwhelming force to guarantee victory became known as the Powell Doctrine.

In 2001, the point of the Iraq war plan was: Get to Baghdad, and fast. It echoed Rumsfeld’s desire--“assume risk.” The Powell Doctrine of trying to guarantee success was out. Rapid, decisive warfare was in.

Pre-Iraq warnings to Bush about difficult post-war governing

“You’re sure?” asked Powell. Bush said he was. “You understand the consequences,” Powell offered in a half question. For nearly six months, Powell had been hammering on the theme of the complexity of governing Iraq after the war. “You know that you’re going to be owning this place?”

Bush said he realized that. “Are you with me on this?” Powell, “Time to put your war uniform on.”

The president very reluctantly confirmed to me that he had asked Powell directly for his support but added testily a rather obvious point. “I didn’t need his permission.”

If we knew of no WMDs, war decision would've differed

Condi Rice called Powell. She and the president were "mad," she said. Powell had "given the Democrats a remarkable tool." His remarks were making headlines throughout the world. Bush's public position was that the jury was still out on WMD. So Powell had to go back out in public and retract his remarks, saying 5 times that the president's decision to go to war had been "right."

OpEd: conglomerate of inaccurate statements to UN on Iraq

Although the deceptiveness of these statements was later revealed, most of our trusting citizens were supportive of the war. Exaggerated claims of catastrophe from nonexistent WMDs kept the fears alive. Colin Powell went to the UN to make a conglomeration of inaccurate statements to the world. The administration later claimed that its information was erroneous, but intelligence sources were rewarded, not chastised.

There is little wonder that, at least for a few months, fearful American citizens and members of Congress supported the unnecessary war.

We must stay the course in Iraq & provide more resources

Rejects Kofi Annan’s assertion that Iraq war is illegal

9/12/01: Urged focus on Al Qaeda, not Iraq

By afternoon, Rumsfeld was still going on about "getting Iraq." When Colin Powell urged that they focus on Al Qaeda, Rumsfeld pushed anew for the Iraq option. "Rumsfeld complained that there were no decent targets for bombing in Afghanistan and that we should consider bombing Iraq, which he said had better targets. At first I thought Rumsfeld was joking. But he was serious."

Powell says that intelligence on WMD in Iraq not “solid”

Contradicted Cheney and sought more UN involvement

For the first 16 months of the administration, Powell had been “in the refrigerator,” as he called his frequent isolation. [Finally, in Aug. 2002, Powell presented his case without Cheney present] and Bush asked, “What else can I do?” Powell offered, “You can still make a pitch for a coalition or UN action to do what needs to be done.“

[In response, Cheney said in a speech], ”There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance with UN resolutions.“ Powell was astonished. It was a preemptive attack on what the president had agreed to 10 days earlier. Powell was accused of contradicting Cheney and of disloyalty. How can I be disloyal, he wondered, when I’m giving the president’s stated position?

Invading Iraq means “owning” it, for better or worse

“You understand the consequences,” Powell said in a half question. For nearly six months, he had been hammering on this theme-that the US would be taking down a regime, would have to govern Iraq, and the ripple effect in the Middle East and the world could not be predicted. “You know that you’re going to be owning this place?” Powell said. An invasion would mean assuming the hopes, aspirations and all the troubles of Iraq. Powell wasn’t sure whether Bush had fully understood the meaning and consequences of total ownership.

But I think I have to do this, the president said, making it clear this was not a discussion, but the president informing one of his Cabinet members of his decision. The fork in the road had been reached and Bush had chosen war. In all the discussions, meetings, chats and back-and-forth, the president had never once asked Powell, Would you do this?

Inspectors are inspectors, not detectives

The facts show Iraq has not disarmed

Iraq moved weapons to hide them from inspectors

Saddam has enough anthrax to kill thousands

WMD inspectors eluded by producing weapons in mobile labs

Photo shows Iraqi jet modified to spray anthrax

Iraq has at least 100 tons of chemical weapons

Iraq has been trying to enrich uranium

Intelligence shows links between Iraq and terrorists

Documented ties between Iraq & Al Qaida

Our future is frightening unless we act against Iraq

Saddam killed 5,000 Kurds with mustard & nerve gas

Post 9/11, we cannot allow Iraq to have nuclear weapons

Iraq close to facing serious consequences for defiance

Predicted Iraq war would suck the oxygen from War on Terror

War would suck the oxygen out of just about everything else the US was doing, not only in the war on terrorism, but also in all other diplomatic, defense and intelligence relationships, Powell said. The economic implications could be staggering, potentially driving the supply and price of oil in directions that were as-yet unimagined.

Following victory, the day-after implications were giant. What of the image of an American general running an Arab country for some length of time? he asked. A General MacArthur in Baghdad? This would be a big event within Iraq, the region and the world. How long would it last? No one could know. How would success be defined?

Predicted Saddam’s mischief in 1994

1991: continuing conflict into Baghdad would be un-American

"I remember very clearly Colin Powell saying that this thing was turning into a massacre," Robert Gates, then the deputy national security adviser later recalled. "And that to continue it beyond a certain point would be un-American, and he even used the word unchivalrous." Bush agreed, and drew the war to a quick close. After the war ended, President Bush urged Iraqis to "take matters into their own hands."

For this part, Saddam Hussein came to believe that the United States lacked the commitment to follow through on its rhetoric. He saw America as unwilling to take the risks necessary for an invasion of Iraq.

1991: Leave Saddam enough power to threaten Iran

Bush & whole Cabinet agreed on multilateral approach on Iraq

Favored containment over invasion in both Iraq wars

During the first Persian Gulf War, Powell had played the role of reluctant warrior, arguing to the first President Bush, perhaps too mildly, that containing Iraq might work, that war might not be necessary. But as the principal military adviser, he hadn’t pressed his arguments that forcefully because they were less military than political. Now as secretary of state, his account was politics. He decided he had to come down very hard, state his convictions and conclusions so there would be no doubt as to where he stood

Support Iraqi opposition while maintaining sanctions

The US had provided covert aid to opposition groups in the years after the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. But those efforts came to a tumultuous end when Hussein’s military rolled into the US-protected “safe area” of northern Iraq, routing the opposition. Opposition organizations can now draw from $4 million set aside by Congress for gathering information inside Iraq.

1990: Encourage Iraqi to leave Kuwait to avoid US deaths

He hoped to demonstrate to the world and to his critics that he was determined to go the extra mile to achieve a peaceful resolution. He could not have a war without maximizing his effort to at least speak with the Iraqis. "So if he gets out without a war, that's okay?" Bush asked Powell.

"Yes, sir," Powell replied. That was the goal of both the US and the UN: Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. If there was no war, no US servicemen would be killed, Powell stated, speaking like a good military leader looking out for his troops. [But if Saddam withdrew] it would be politically and logistically impossible--and politically unsupportable in the US--to keep the troops there for an extended period. The president said plainly, "We have to have a war." His words hung in the air as heavily as any he had ever spoken.

Unapologetic about not taking Baghdad; result spread peace

Not only did Desert Storm [the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991] accomplish its political objective, it started to reverse the climate of chronic hostility in the Middle East. King Hussein of Jordan and Yasser Arafat, chairman of the PLO, were the only two major Arab leaders who showed any support for the Iraqi position during the Gulf War, and both were weakened by their stance. As a result, three years later, they were trying to reach accommodations with Israel and their other neighbors. The Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, following Desert Storm, started the process that resulted in the historic agreement between Arafat and Israel in 1993, and the peace treaty between King Hussein and Israel in 1994.

Air strikes can’t guarantee changes; only ground troops can

My constant, unwelcome message at all the meetings on Bosnia was simply that we should not commit military forces until we had a clear political objective.