Xavier Becerra on Free Trade Democratic Representative (CA-31)

Rated 39% by CATO, indicating a mixed record on trade issues.

The mission of the Cato Institute Center for Trade Policy Studies is to increase public understanding of the benefits of free trade and the costs of protectionism.

The Cato Trade Center focuses not only on U.S. protectionism, but also on trade barriers around the world. Cato scholars examine how the negotiation of multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements can reduce trade barriers and provide institutional support for open markets. Not all trade agreements, however, lead to genuine liberalization. In this regard, Trade Center studies scrutinize whether purportedly market-opening accords actually seek to dictate marketplace results, or increase bureaucratic interference in the economy as a condition of market access.

Studies by Cato Trade Center scholars show that the United States is most effective in encouraging open markets abroad when it leads by example. The relative openness and consequent strength of the U.S. economy already lend powerful support to the worldwide trend toward embracing open markets. Consistent adherence by the United States to free trade principles would give this trend even greater momentum. Thus, Cato scholars have found that unilateral liberalization supports rather than undermines productive trade negotiations.

Scholars at the Cato Trade Center aim at nothing less than changing the terms of the trade policy debate: away from the current mercantilist preoccupation with trade balances, and toward a recognition that open markets are their own reward.

The following ratings are based on the votes the organization considered most important; the numbers reflect the percentage of time the representative voted the organization`s preferred position.

Impose tariffs against countries which manipulate currency.

• Amends the Tariff Act of 1930 to include as a `countervailable subsidy` requiring action under a countervailing duty or antidumping duty proceeding the benefit conferred on merchandise imported into the US from foreign countries with fundamentally undervalued currency.
• Defines `benefit conferred` as the difference between:
  1. the amount of currency provided by a foreign country in which the subject merchandise is produced; and
  2. the amount of currency such country would have provided if the real effective exchange rate of its currency were not fundamentally undervalued.
• Determines that the currency of a foreign country is fundamentally undervalued if for an 18-month period:
  1. the government of the country engages in protracted, large-scale intervention in one or more foreign exchange markets
  2. the country`s real effective exchange rate is undervalued by at least 5%
  3. the country has experienced significant and persistent global current account surpluses; and
  4. the country`s government has foreign asset reserves exceeding the amount necessary to repay all its debt obligations.

[Explanatory note from Wikipedia.com `Exchange Rate`]:

Between 1994 and 2005, the Chinese yuan renminbi was pegged to the US dollar at RMB 8.28 to $1. Countries may gain an advantage in international trade if they manipulate the value of their currency by artificially keeping its value low. It is argued that China has succeeded in doing this over a long period of time. However, a 2005 appreciation of the Yuan by 22% was followed by a 39% increase in Chinese imports to the US. In 2010, other nations, including Japan & Brazil, attempted to devalue their currency in the hopes of subsidizing cheap exports and bolstering their ailing economies. A low exchange rate lowers the price of a country`s goods for consumers in other countries but raises the price of imported goods for consumers in the manipulating country.

$25B more loans from Export-Import Bank.

This bill raises the cap on outstanding loans, guarantees, and insurance of the Export-Import Bank of the United States for FY2015-FY2022 and afterwards. The Bank shall:

• Provide technical assistance to small businesses on how to apply for financial assistance from the Bank;
• Establish programs under which private financial institutions may share risk in the loans, guarantees, and other Bank products in exchange for receiving fees received from program participants.
• The Bank may enter into up to $25 billion worth of contracts of reinsurance, co-finance, or other risk-sharing arrangements on its portfolio or individual transactions with insurance companies, financial institutions, or export credit agencies.

Opponents reasons for voting NAY: (Washington Examiner, 12/2/12): The Export-Import Bank is a taxpayer-backed agency that finances U.S. exports, primarily though loan guarantees. You`d think the bank would spread the money around to nurture up-and-coming businesses. You`d be wrong, very wrong. In fact, 83% of its taxpayer-backed loan guarantees in 2012 went to just one exporter: Boeing. Welcome to the `New Economic Patriotism,` where the big get bigger and taxpayers bear the risk. Ex-Im is at the heart of Obama`s National Export Initiative and is a pillar of the economic patriotism that Obama pledged in a second term. When government hands out more money, the guys with the best lobbyists and the closest ties to power will disproportionately get their hands on that money. Obama has spent four years pushing more subsidies, more bailouts and more regulations. `New Economic Patriotism` basically amounts to a national industrial policy -- Washington championing certain major domestic companies and industries, as if the global economy were an Olympic competition.

Rated 63% by the USAE, indicating a mixed record on trade.

Ratings by USA*Engage indicate support for trade engagement or trade sanctions. The organization`s self-description: `USA*Engage is concerned about the proliferation of unilateral foreign policy sanctions at the federal, state and local level. Despite the fact that broad trade-based unilateral sanctions rarely achieve our foreign policy goals, they continue to have political appeal. Unilateral sanctions give the impression that the United States is `doing something,` while American workers, farmers and businesses absorb the costs.`

USA*Engage at Work
• Developing the Case: USA*Engage explains the benefits of economic engagement, and the high cost of sanctions for American exports, investment and jobs.
• Education: We recruit respected foreign policy and economic experts to speak out against sanctions, actively engage the media and provide outreach to key target states and Congressional districts.
• Contacting Government Officials: USA*Engage directly contacts Congressional, Administration, state and local officials.

VoteMatch scoring for the USA*Engage ratings is as follows :

• 0%-49%: supports trade sanctions;
• 50%-74%: mixed record on trade engagement;
• 75%-100%: supports trade engagement.

No MFN for China; condition trade on human rights.

The Progressive Caucus opposes awarding China permanent Most Favored Nation trading status at this time. We believe that it would be a serious setback for the protection and expansion of worker rights, human rights and religious rights. We also believe it will harm the US economy. We favor continuing to review on an annual basis China’s trading status, and we believe it is both legal and consistent with US WTO obligations to do so. The Progressive Caucus believes that trade relations with the US should be conditioned on the protection of worker rights, human rights and religious rights. If Congress gives China permanent MFN status, the US will lose the best leverage we have to influence China to enact those rights and protections. At the current time, the US buys about 40% of China’s exports, making it a consumer with a lot of potential clout. So long as the US annually continues to review China’s trade status, we have the ability to debate achievement of basic worker and human rights and to condition access to the US market on the achievement of gains in worker and human rights, if necessary. But once China is given permanent MFN, it permanently receives unconditional access to the US market and we lose that leverage. China will be free to attract multinational capital on the promise of super low wages, unsafe workplace conditions and prison labor and permanent access to the US market.

Furthermore, giving China permanent MFN will be harmful to the US economy, since the record trade deficit with China (and attendant problems such as loss of US jobs, and lower average wages in the US) will worsen. For 1999, the trade deficit is likely to be nearly $70 billion. Once China is awarded permanent MFN and WTO membership, the trade deficit will worsen.