Richard Durbin on War & Peace Democratic Sr Senator (IL)

Engage China to de-escalate North Korean nukes

Sen. DURBIN: The last thing we want is the launch of any kind of nuclear missile or nuclear weapon on the Korean peninsula. We've got to deescalate the rhetoric and the testing that's going on in North Korea and we're turning primarily to China, to tell the North Koreans if they want to continue this kind of escalation of rhetoric, it's at the expense of the safety of this world, as well as their own economy.

Q: Sen. Cornyn, a year ago, you accused Obama of a policy of appeasement towards North Korea.

Sen. CORNYN (R-TX): Well, I'm not for paying an unhinged leader like Kim Jong Un ransom in order to have him toned down his rhetoric. None of us wants [nuclear conflict]. But I don't see that this policy of paying ransom just to get him to tone down rhetoric has been successful. It's just sort of like a bad movie. We keep seeing the reruns.

1990 Gulf War: We may be repeating Vietnam experience

"Personally, and I can speak for many members of our caucus, we are products of the Vietnam experience," said Representative Dick Durbin of Illinois. "We are really touched by the possibility that we may be repeating that experience."

We can' afford $10B to $15B a month in Iraq

Durbin argued the United States can't afford to keep spending $10 billion to $15 billion a month, along with soldiers' lives, to rebuild Iraq. He called for a "systematic, sensible withdrawal."

Ensure that the military are given the resources they need

I fully support the Democrats' Real Security Plan that calls for a year of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty. The Bush Administration has promised Americans that Iraqi soldiers would stan up & fight for their own country. The rhetoric from the White House does not match the sad reality on the ground in Iraq. We must hold the Administration accountable until they keep their promises in Iraq so our soldiers can come back home.

Americans feel less secure today because the Bush Administration's budget shortchanges our police and firefighters; refuses to provide the necessary resources to secure our ports and chemical and nuclear plants; and fails to offer a plan for victory in Iraq.

Condemns anti-Muslim bigotry in name of anti-terrorism.

Title: Condemning bigotry and violence against Sikh Americans in the wake of terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001.

Summary: Declares that, in the quest to identify, locate, and bring to justice the perpetrators and sponsors of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the civil rights and liberties of all Americans, including Sikh-Americans, should be protected.

• Condemns bigotry and acts of violence or discrimination against any Americans, including Sikh-Americans.
• Calls upon local and Federal law enforcement authorities to: (1) work to prevent hate crimes against all Americans; and (2) prosecute to the fullest extent of the law all those who commit hate crimes.

CIA mischaracterized Iraq WMD & abused intelligence position.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
• Conclusion 1. Most of the major key judgments in the Oct. 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq`s Continuing Programs for WMD, either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of failures led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence.
• Conclusion 2. The Intelligence Community (IC) did not accurately or adequately explain to policymakers the uncertainties behind the judgments in the Oct. 2002 NIE.
• Conclusion 3. The Intelligence Community suffered from a collective presumption that Iraq had an active and growing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. This `group think` dynamic led IC analysts, collectors and managers to both interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD program as well as ignore or minimize evidence that Iraq did not have active and expanding WMD programs.
• Conclusion 4. In a few significant instances, the analysis in the NIE suffers from a `layering` effect whereby assessments were built based on previous judgments without carrying forward the uncertainties of the underlying judgments.
• Conclusion 5. IC managers did not encourage analysts to challenge their assumptions, fully consider alternative arguments, accurately characterize the intelligence reporting, or counsel analysts who lost their objectivity.
• Conclusion 6. The Committee found significant short-comings in almost every aspect of human intelligence collection efforts against Iraq`s WMD activities, in particular that the IC had no sources collecting against WMD in Iraq after 1998. Most, if not all, of these problems stem from a broken corporate culture and poor management, and will not be solved by additional funding and personnel.
• Conclusion 7. The CIA, in several significant instances, abused its unique position in the IC, particularly in terms of information sharing, to the detriment of the IC`s prewar analysis concerning Iraq`s WMD programs.

Iraq-al-Qaida contacts, but no complicity or assistance.

IRAQI LINKS TO TERRORISM
• Conclusion 90. The CIA`s assessment that Saddam Hussein was most likely to use his own intelligence service operatives to conduct attacks was reasonable, and turned out to be accurate.
• Conclusion 91. The CIA`s assessment that Iraq had maintained ties to several secular Palestinian terrorist groups was supported by the intelligence. The CIA was also reasonable in judging that Iraq appeared to have been reaching out to more effective terrorist groups and might have intended to employ such surrogates in the event of war.
• Conclusion 92. The CIA`s examination of contacts, training, safehaven and operational cooperation as indicators of a possible Iraq-al-Qaida relationship was a reasonable and objective approach to the question.
• Conclusion 93. The CIA reasonably assessed that there were likely several instances of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida throughout the 1990s, but that these contacts did not add up to an established formal relationship.
• Conclusion 94. The CIA reasonably and objectively assessed that the most problematic area of contact between Iraq and al-Qaida were the reports of training in the use of non-conventional weapons, specifically chemical and biological weapons.
• Conclusion 95. The CIA`s assessment on safehaven—that al-Qaida or associated operatives were present in Baghdad and in northeastern Iraq in an area under Kurdish control—was reasonable.
• Conclusion 96. The CIA`s assessment that to date there was no evidence proving Iraqi complicity or assistance in an al-Qaida attack was reasonable and objective. No additional information has emerged to suggest otherwise.
• Conclusion 97. The CIA`s judgment that Saddam Hussein, if sufficiently desperate, might employ terrorists with a global reach—al-Qaida—to conduct terrorist attacks in the event of war, was reasonable. No information has emerged thus far to suggest that Saddam did try to employ al-Qaida in conducting terrorist attacks.

CIA knew State of the Union Iraq-Niger connection was false.

NIGER CONCLUSIONS
• Conclusion 16. The language in the Oct. 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that `Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake` overstated what the Intelligence Community (IC) knew about Iraq`s possible procurement attempts.
• Conclusion 18. When documents regarding the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting [weakening the Iraq-Niger connection] became available to the IC in October 2002, CIA analysts and operations officers should have made an effort to obtain copies. As a result of not obtaining the documents, CIA Iraq nuclear analysts continued to report on Iraqi efforts to procure uranium from Africa and continued to approve the use of such language in Administration publications and speeches.
• Conclusion 19. Even after obtaining the forged documents and being alerted by a State Department analyst about problems with them, analysts at both the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) did not examine them carefully enough to see the obvious problems with the documents. Both agencies continued to publish assessments that Iraq may have been seeking uranium from Africa. In addition, CIA continued to approve the use of similar language in Administration publications and speeches, including the State of the Union.
• Conclusion 21. When coordinating the State of the Union, no CIA analysts or officials told the National Security Council (NSC) to remove the `16 words` or that there were concerns about the credibility of the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting. A CIA official`s original testimony to the Committee that he told an NSC official to remove the words `Niger` and `500 tons` from the speech, is incorrect.
• Conclusion 22. The Director of the CIA should have taken the time to read the State of the Union speech and fact check it himself. Had he done so, he would have been able to alert the NSC if he still had concerns about the use of the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting in a Presidential speech.

Iraq was not reconstituting its nuclear program.

NUCLEAR CONCLUSIONS
• Conclusion 27. The judgment in the NIE, that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program, was not supported by the intelligence. The Committee agrees with the State Department`s alternative view that the available intelligence `does not add up to a compelling case for reconstitution.`
• Conclusion 29. Numerous intelligence reports provided to the Committee showed that Iraq was trying to procure high-strength aluminum tubes. The Committee believes that the information available to the Intelligence Community indicated that these tubes were intended to be used for an Iraqi conventional rocket program and not a nuclear program.
• Conclusion 31. The Intelligence Community`s position in the NIE that the composition and dimensions of the aluminum tubes exceeded the requirements for non nuclear applications, is incorrect.
• Conclusion 33. The suggestion in the NIE that Iraq was paying excessively high costs for the aluminum tubes is incorrect. In addition, 7075-T6 aluminum is not considerably more expensive than other more readily available materials for rockets as alleged in the NIE.
• Conclusion 34. The analysis that the material composition of the tubes was unusual for rocket motor cases was incorrect, contradicted information later provided to the Committee, and represented a serious lapse for the agency with primary responsibility for conventional ground forces intelligence analysis.
• Conclusion 38. The CIA’s initial reporting on its aluminum tube spin tests was, at a minimum, misleading and, in some cases, incorrect. The fact that these tests were not coordinated with other Intelligence Community agencies is an example of continuing problems with information sharing within the Intelligence Community.
• Conclusion 39. Iraq`s performance of hydrostatic pressure tests on the tubes was more indicative of their likely use for a rocket program than a centrifuge program.

Iraq was not developing its biological weapons program.

BIOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS
• Conclusion 48. The assessment in the Oct. 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that, `We judge that all key aspects—research & development, production, and weaponization—of Iraq`s offensive biological weapons program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War` is not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
• Conclusion 49. The statement in the key judgments of the NIE that `Baghdad has biological weapons` overstated what was known about Iraq`s biological weapons holdings. The NIE did not explain the uncertainties underlying this statement.
• Conclusion 50. The statement in the NIE that `Baghdad has mobile transportable facilities for producing bacterial and toxin biological weapons agents,` overstated what the intelligence reporting suggested about an Iraqi mobile biological weapons effort and did not accurately convey to readers the uncertainties behind the source reporting.
• Conclusion 53. The statement in the key judgments of the NIE that `Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq`s offensive biological weapons program` is not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
• Conclusion 55. The NIE misrepresented the United Nations Special Commission`s (UNSCOM) 1999 assessment concerning Iraq`s biological research capability.
• Conclusion 56. The statement in the key judgments of the NIE that `Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered biological weapons agents,` overstated both the intelligence reporting and analysts assessments of Iraq`s development of genetically engineered biological agents.
• Conclusion 57. The assessment in the NIE that `Iraq has ... dry biological weapons (BW) agents in its arsenal` is not supported by the intelligence information provided to the Committee.

Iraq was not developing its chemical weapons program.

CHEMICAL CONCLUSIONS
• Conclusion 58. The statement in the key judgments of the October 2002 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate that `Baghdad has ... chemical weapons` overstated both what was known about Iraq`s chemical weapons holdings and what intelligence analysts judged about Iraq`s chemical weapons holdings.
• Conclusion 59. The judgment in the October 2002 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate that Iraq was expanding its chemical industry primarily to support chemical weapons production overstated both what was known about expansion of Iraq`s chemical industry and what intelligence analysts judged about expansion of Iraq`s chemical industry.
• Conclusion 61. The Intelligence Community`s assessment that `Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of chemical weapons agents — much of it added in the last year,` was an analytical judgment and not based on intelligence reporting that indicated the existence of an Iraqi chemical weapons stockpile of this size.
• Conclusion 62. The Intelligence Community`s assessment that Iraq had experience in manufacturing chemical weapons bombs, artillery rockets and projectiles was reasonable based on intelligence derived from Iraqi declarations.
• Conclusion 63. The National Intelligence Estimate assessment that `Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limited chemical weapons production hidden within Iraq`s legitimate chemical industry` was not substantiated by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
• Conclusion 64. The National Intelligence Estimate accurately represented information known about Iraq`s procurement of defensive equipment.

Iraq was developing missiles, but not to reach the US.

DELIVERY CONCLUSIONS
• Conclusion 65. The Intelligence Community (IC) assessment that Iraq retains a small force of Scud-type ballistic missiles was reasonable based on the information provided to the Committee. The estimate that Iraq retained `up to a few dozen Scud-variant missiles,` was clearly explained in the body of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) to be an assessment based `on no direct evidence.`
• Conclusion 66. The assessments that Iraq was in the final stages of development of [missiles] which exceed the 150-km UN range limit, were reasonable judgments based on the intelligence available to the Committee.
• Conclusion 68. The IC assessment in the key judgments section of the NIE that Iraq was developing an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) `probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents` overstated both what was known about the mission of Iraq`s small UAVs and what intelligence analysts judged about the likely mission of Iraq`s small UAVs. The Air Force footnote which indicated that biological weapons (BW) delivery was a possible, though unlikely, mission more accurately reflected the body of intelligence reporting.
• Conclusion 70. The IC`s assessment that Iraq`s procurement of US-specific mapping software for its UAV `strongly suggests that Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the US` was not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
• Conclusion 71. The CIA`s failure to share all of the intelligence reporting regarding Iraq`s attempts to acquire US mapping software with other IC agencies left those analysts with an incomplete understanding of the issue. This lack of information sharing may have led some analysts to agree to a position that they otherwise would not have supported.
• Conclusion 72. Much of the information provided or cleared by the CIA for inclusion in Secretary Powell`s speech was overstated, misleading, or incorrect.

No troop surge: no military escalation in Iraq.

Sponsor`s introductory remarks: Sen. BIDEN: This bipartisan resolution opposes the President`s plan to escalate the war in Iraq. This resolution says what we and many of our colleagues, Democrats and Republicans, are against: deepening America`s military involvement in Iraq by escalating our troop presence. Just as important, it says what we and many of our colleagues are for: a strategy that can produce a political settlement in Iraq. That`s the only way to stop Shiites and Sunnis from killing each other and allow our troops to leave Iraq without leaving chaos behind.

Excertps from resolution:
• Whereas the US strategy and presence on the ground in Iraq can only be sustained with the support of the American people and bipartisan support from Congress;
• Whereas maximizing chances of success in Iraq should be our goal, and the best chance of success requires a change in current strategy;
• Whereas the situation in Iraq is damaging the standing, influence, and interests of the US in Iraq, the Middle East, and around the world;
• Whereas more than 3,000 US military personnel have already lost their lives in Iraq, and more than 22,500 have been wounded in Iraq;
• Whereas on January 10, 2007, Pres. Bush announced his plan to deepen the US military involvement in Iraq by deploying approximately 21,000 additional US combat forces to Iraq;
• Whereas an open-ended commitment of US forces in Iraq is unsustainable and a deterrent to the Iraqis making the political compromises that are needed for violence to end and for stability and security to be achieved in Iraq;
• Resolved: That it is the sense of Congress that it is not in the national interest of the US to deepen its military involvement in Iraq, particularly by escalating the US military force presence in Iraq;
• the United States should engage nations in the Middle East to develop a regional, internationally-sponsored peace and reconciliation process for Iraq.

Deploy UN multinational peacekeeping force in Darfur.

Calling for the urgent deployment of a robust and effective multinational peacekeeping mission with sufficient size, resources, leadership, and mandate to protect civilians in Darfur.

• Whereas hundreds of thousands of people have died and approximately 2,500,000 people have been displaced in Darfur, Sudan since 2003;
• Whereas Congress declared on July 22, 2004 that the atrocities in Darfur were genocide;
• Whereas the Sudanese President refused to allow the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force to Darfur;
• Whereas deliberately targeting civilians and people providing humanitarian assistance during an armed conflict is a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law, and those who commit such violations must be held accountable;
• Whereas on June 11, 2007, Sudanese President al-Bashir pledged to accept unconditionally the full United Nations-African Union hybrid deployment;
• Whereas to establish conditions of peace and security, the peacekeeping mission must be accompanied by a peace-building process among the parties to the conflict;
• Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the Senate urges the President of the US to work with members of the UN Security Council and the African Union to ensure the expeditious deployment of the United Nations-African Union hybrid peacekeeping force with a mandate affirming that civilian protection is a primary mission objective;
• Provide the UN-African Union hybrid force with sufficient logistical support and airlift capacity; and necessary vehicles, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters for tactical reconnaissance and armed deterrence;
• Be prepared to implement meaningful measures, including the imposition of multilateral sanctions, an arms embargo, and a no-fly zone for Sudanese military flights over Darfur, if the Government of Sudan obstructs deployment of the agreed upon peacekeeping mission.

Legislative Outcome: Agreed to by Senate by Unanimous Consent.

Iranian nuclear weapons: prevention instead of containment.

Expressing the sense of Congress regarding the nuclear program of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
• Whereas, since at least the late 1980s, Iran has engaged in a sustained pattern of illicit and deceptive activities to acquire nuclear capability;
• Whereas the UN Security Council has adopted multiple resolutions since 2006 demanding the full suspension of all uranium enrichment-related activities by Iran, particularly possible military dimensions;
• Whereas, in Nov. 2011, the IAEA issued an extensive report that documents `serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran`s nuclear programme`;
• Whereas top leaders of Iran have repeatedly threatened the existence of the State of Israel;
• Whereas the Department of State has designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984;
• Whereas Iran has provided weapons, training, & funding to terrorist groups, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Shiite militias in Iraq;
• Whereas Iran had forged a `secret deal` with al Qaeda to facilitate the movement of al Qaeda fighters and funding through Iranian territory;

1. Reaffirms that the US Government has a vital interest in working together to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability;
2. warns that time is limited to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability;
3. urges continued and increasing economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran until a full and sustained suspension of all uranium enrichment-related activities;
4. expresses that the window for diplomacy is closing;
5. expresses support for the universal rights and democratic aspirations of the people of Iran;
6. strongly supports US policy to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability;
7. rejects any US policy that would rely on containment as an option in response to the Iranian nuclear threat.

Require Congress' approval before military action in Iran.

RESOLUTION Affirming that any offensive military action taken against Iran must be explicitly approved by Congress.
• WHEREAS article I, section 8, of the Constitution of the United States vests in Congress all power to declare war:
• NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That any offensive military action taken by the United States against Iran must be explicitly approved by Congress before such action may be initiated.
Sen. DURBIN. `We are now more than halfway through our fifth year in this war in Iraq. We find ourselves stuck as an occupier in a Middle East civil war. Thousands of our sons & daughters have been killed or injured. The total financial cost may be well over $1 trillion--money, I might add, that this administration has borrowed against our children`s future.

`America`s reputation internationally has been severely damaged and critical military, diplomatic, and intelligence resources have been diverted from the war in Afghanistan--a war I supported, and a country this administration has increasingly neglected. And now, after so many errors, so many lives, and so much damage, this administration is again raising the prospect of yet another war in the Middle East--this time a war with Iran.

`I fear this administration has learned nothing from the colossal error, colossal misjudgment in the invasion of Iraq. Let me be clear: I am gravely concerned about Iran`s activities in the region and its nuclear agenda. But any offensive action against Iran must be approved by Congress.

`Recent statements by this administration give me concern that this administration is considering just this--an offensive military action against Iran without the consent of Congress. Both Pres. Bush and Vice Pres. Cheney have made public remarks about Iran that suggest an administration readying for military aggression. We know Cheney`s historic views on fundamental checks and balances in our constitution. They are disturbing.`

Source: Resolution on Iran (S.RES.356) 2007-SR356 on Oct 25, 2007

Sanctions on Iran to end nuclear program.

Durbin signed Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act
Expresses the sense of Congress that:
1. diplomatic efforts to address Iran`s illicit nuclear efforts, unconventional and ballistic missile development programs, and support for international terrorism are more likely to be effective if the President is empowered with explicit authority to impose additional sanctions on the government of Iran;
2. US concerns regarding Iran are strictly the result of that government`s actions; and
3. the people of the United States have feelings of friendship for the people of Iran and regret that developments in recent decades have created impediments to that friendship.
States that it should be US policy to:
1. support international diplomatic efforts to end Iran`s uranium enrichment program and its nuclear weapons program;
2. encourage foreign governments to direct state-owned and private entities to cease all investment in, and support of, Iran`s energy sector and all exports of refined petroleum products to Iran;
3. impose sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and any other Iranian financial institution engaged in proliferation activities or support of terrorist groups; and
4. work with allies to protect the international financial system from deceptive and illicit practices by Iranian financial institutions involved in proliferation activities or support of terrorist groups.
• Amends the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 to direct the President to impose sanctions if a person has made an investment of $20 million or more (or any combination of investments of at least $5 million which in the aggregate equals or exceeds $20 million in any 12-month period) that directly and significantly contributed to Iran`s ability to develop its petroleum resources. (Under current law the sanction thresholds are $40 million, $10 million, and $40 million, respectively.)
• Establishes additional sanctions prohibiting specified foreign exchange, banking, and property transactions.
• Includes refined petroleum resources.
Source: S.908&HR.2194 2009-S908 on Apr 30, 2009

No military force against Iran without Congress approval.

Durbin voted YEA the Iran War Powers Resolution

Axios.com summary: The House passed a symbolic war powers resolution directing President Trump to halt the use of military force against Iran unless he obtains approval from Congress.

The big picture: A classified briefing on the killing of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani [by the US military] left Democrats and even some Republicans deeply skeptical, with many claiming that officials did not provide evidence that there was an `imminent` threat from Iran. Sens. Mike Lee (R-UT) and Rand Paul (R-KY) said they will vote in favor of a similar resolution in the Senate [S J Res 68].

What opponents are saying: Former national security adviser and notorious Iran hawk John Bolton tweeted: `The 1973 War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional. It reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of how the Constitution allocated foreign affairs authority between the President and Congress. The Resolution should be repealed.` Pres. Trump quote tweeted Bolton and added: `Smart analysis, I fully agree!`

What supporters are saying: Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL) was one of the few Republicans to vote in favor of the resolution, stating on the House floor: `Killing Soleimani was the right decision, but engaging in another forever war in the Middle East would be the wrong decision.` Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) introduced legislation that would block funding for offensive military force against Iran without congressional authorization. Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA) is also seeking to repeal the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which has been used repeatedly to justify war in the Middle East in the wake of 9/11. Lee was the only member of Congress to vote against the AUMF in 2001, criticizing it as a `blank check.`

Legislative outcome: H Con Res 83 Passed House 224-194-13 on 1/9/20; S J Res 68 passed Senate 55-45-0 on 2/13/20. Vetoed 5/6; Senate veto override failed 5/7/20.

Source: Congressional vote 20-SCR33 on Jan 9, 2020

Sponsored bill to oppose Israeli annexation of West Bank.

Durbin co-sponsored Resolution on Israeli Annexation

Congressional summary: A resolution affirming the United States commitment to the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and noting that Israeli annexation of territory in the West Bank would undermine peace,, harm Israel`s relationship with its Arab neighbors, threaten Israel`s Jewish and democratic identity, and undermine Israel`s security.

Aljazeera summary, 4/22/20: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that it was Israel`s decision whether to annex parts of the occupied West Bank, and the US will offer its views on this to the new Israeli government in private. `As for the annexation of the West Bank, the Israelis will ultimately make those decisions,` Pompeo told reporters. Israel`s intention--in accordance with President Trump`s Middle East plan--to annex the Jordan Valley and illegal Jewish settlements would defy international law. Last year, the Trump administration said it would no longer abide by a 1978 State Department legal opinion that the settlements were `inconsistent with international law`.

Letter to Secretary Pompeo from 13 members of Congress on 6/30/20: We express our deep concern over the planned annexation of occupied Palestinian territory by the government of Israel. Annexing parts of the West Bank will perpetuate and entrench human rights violations against the Palestinian people, including limitations on freedom of movement and mass expropriation of privately-owned Palestinian land. Furthermore, Israel has stated it will not grant citizenship to Palestinians living in annexed territory or to the many more Palestinians living in the isolated enclaves that Israel will opt not to annex, paving the path toward an apartheid system. Already existing Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, amount to a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

Legislative outcome: Never reached a vote.

Source: S.Res.234 20-SRes234 on Jun 5, 2019

Sponsored resolution to repeal 2002 AUMF against Iraq.

Durbin co-sponsored AUMF Repeal Act
Resolution excerpts:
• Whereas the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 1991 and 2002 currently remain valid law;
• Whereas, since 2014, U.S. military forces have operated in Iraq at the request of the Government of Iraq for the sole purpose of supporting its efforts to combat ISIS;
• Whereas authorizations for the use of military force that are no longer necessary should have a clear political and legal ending:
• Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States [that]
• The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq is hereby repealed.

Politico.com in OPPOSITION, 3/25/21: Republicans who opposed repealing the 2002 authorization said that it should be replaced because Iraq is still home to terror groups that threaten the United States. Rep. Michael McCaul called for consultations with first in order to craft a replacement. `Real AUMF reform requires Congress and the administration working together on actual text to replace the aging 2001 and 2002 AUMFs to provide authorities needed to keep the American people, and, most importantly, our deployed troops, safe from terrorists,` McCaul said.

Heritage Foundation in SUPPORT (1/6/20): There has been an open and vibrant debate about whether the 2001 AUMF covers ISIS, a terrorist organization that did not even exist when the 2001 statute was passed and has disavowed and formally broken away from al-Qaeda, the group that is covered by the 2001 AUMF. Yet both the Obama and Trump Administrations claim that the 2001 AUMF covers ISIS and associated forces. Congress has shied away from the much-needed debate about whether the 2002 Iraq AUMF is no longer necessary.

Legislative Outcome: Passed House 268-161-2 on H.R.256 on 6/17/2021 (rollcall 172; no vote on S.J.R.10 nor H.R.3261 in 2021)

Source: SJ10/H3261/H256 21-SJR10 on Jun 17, 2021

Move the US Embassy to Jerusalem.

Durbin co-sponsored the Jerusalem Embassy Act
Declares it to be U.S. policy that:
• Jerusalem remain an undivided city in which the rights of every ethnic religious group are protected;
• Jerusalem be recognized as the capital of the State of Israel;
• the U.S. Embassy in Israel be established in Jerusalem no later than May 31, 1999.
• Makes specified amounts of such funds available until expended in FY 1996 and 1997 only for construction and other costs associated with relocating the U.S. Embassy Jerusalem.
Corresponding House bill is H.R.1595. Became Public Law No: 104-45. Source: Bill sponsored by 77 Senators and 78 Reps 95-S1322 on Oct 13, 1995

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