Donald Rumsfeld on Homeland Security Secretary of Defense (Pres. Bush Cabinet)

Sub-sections under Homeland Security:
• Abu Ghraib Reports
• Other issues under Homeland Security

June'01: Secretary must authorize lethal force in hijackings

The question that's haunted me from day one is how come the world's biggest military superpower was somehow oblivious to rogue airliners in American air space for more than an hour, and our top brass seemed to be befuddled in terms of dealing with hijackers apparently using these four planes is flying bombs. Why couldn't our fighter jets intercept at least ONE of them?!

Well, here's one possible explanation: Donald Rumsfeld, our Secretary of Defense, never gave the go-ahead. Why? On June 1, 2001, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a new Instruction--superseding one from 1997--that required approval by the Secretary of Defense for any "potentially lethal support in the event of an aircraft piracy (hijacking)."

I sure would like to know why the question of Rumsfeld doing this never came up with the 9/11 Commission. Doesn't it seem important to have asked why the critical policy got changed only four months beforehand?

1972: All-volunteer military by paying competitive salary

Many arguments were offered to bolster both sides if the issue. Some contended that without the draft we would not be able to recruit enough troops. My view was that in every other activity in our society, in both the public & the private sector, we were able to attract and retain the personnel needed without resorting to compulsion. It was done simply by paying them a competitive market wage

OpEd: Falsely claimed no intel warning of 9/11

Here was Rumsfeld, testifying before the 9/11 Commission: "I knew of no intelligence during the six-plus months leading up to September 11 to indicate terrorists would hijack commercial airlines, use them as missiles to fly into the Pentagon or the World Trade Center towers."

Oh, really? What about the intelligence briefing Bush received on August 6, 2001, that was headed "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S." and even mentioned possible hijackings.

These were far from the only warnings. Israel sent two senior agents of the Mossad to Washington in August 2001 to "alert the CIA and FBI to the existence of a cell of as many as 200 terrorists said to be preparing a big operation." The 9/11 Commission was aware of this, but decided to leave it out of their report.

2004 "snowflake": keep terrorism alive as an issue

On November 1, 2007, The Washington Post reported that Donald Rumsfeld's "snowflakes," his memos to staff members, had pointed out the need to keep terrorism alive as an issue throughout his tenure as secretary. Terrorism was a legitimate issue, and references to it benefited the administration politically.

2002: Requiring prisoners to stand 8-10 hours is not torture

"To be considered torture, techniques must produce lasting psychological damage or suffering 'equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.' "
-- Justice Dept. memo, 1/9/02

"Geneva does not apply to our conflict with al-Qaeda; al-Qaeda detainees also do not qualify as prisoners of war."
--George W. Bush, memo, 2/7/02

"I stand 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?"
--Donal Rumsfeld, on an interrogation technique memo, 2002

"Congress doesn't have the power to tie the president's hands in regard to torture as an interrogation technique. They can't prevent the president from ordering torture."
--Justice Dept. memo, 2005

Differentiate known's from unknown's

9/11: First response was to look for Iraq link

By 2004, even Rumsfeld, who saw all of the intelligence availabl to President Bush that might bear on the alleged connection between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, finally admitted under tough repeated questioning from reporters, "To my knowledge, I have not seen any strong, hard evidence that links the two."

Reduce nuclear warheads; Russia no longer a strategic threat

Rumsfeld had in mind a very different role for nuclear weapons in our overall defense posture. This role would reflect changed international circumstances and threat levels, and result in the reduction of deployed warheads over the next several years. Russia was, in fact, no longer a strategic threat (whatever other problems it might pose), and we projected that its nuclear capacities would be dropping like a stone over the next decade. Accordingly, a treaty that simply embodied our own planning levels was hardly a burden, especially if it also provided "exit ramps" to allow for rapid changes in its terms as the strategic threats we faced evolved or increased.

Anchor Chain memo: defense reform takes multiple presidents

"After 2 months on the job, it is clear that the Defense establishment is tangled in its anchor chain," he dictated. Distrust between Congress and the Defense Department was so great, he said, that "the maze of constraints on the Department force it to operate in a manner that is so slow, so ponderous and so inefficient that whatever it ultimately does will inevitably be a decade or so late." Without changing and fixing the relationship with Congress, Rumsfeld concluded, "transformation of our armed forces is not possible."

This "Anchor Chain" memo became notorious among Rumsfeld's staff. It sounded like he had almost given up fixing the Pentagon during the George W. Bush presidency. The task was so hard and would take so long, he dictated, that "our job, therefore, is to work together to sharpen the sword that the next president will wield.

Guantanamo prisoners are "bad guys"; no tribunals needed

At an NSC meeting with the president, Rice began going through a long paper on the issues that everyone was supposed to have read and understood.

Rumsfeld leaned back and made it pretty clear he was not paying much attention. The president also seemed bored. But Rice plowed on.

"Don, what do you think about this?" Bush asked, interrupting Rice.

"They are bad guys," Rumsfeld said.

It was as if Rice and the NSC had one serious, formal process going on while the president and Rumsfeld had another one--informal, chatty and dominant.

Abu Ghraib guards had insufficient training and policies

Several important findings of [the previous MG Ryder report] are clearly relevant to this inquiry:
• Several Division/Brigade collection points and US monitored Iraqi prisons had flawed or insufficiently detailed use of force and other standing operating procedures or policies (e.g. weapons in the facility, improper restraint techniques, detainee management, etc.)
• Currently, Iraqi criminals are detained with security internees in the same facilities.
• The management of multiple disparate groups of detained people in a single location by members of the same unit invites confusion about handling, processing, and treatment
• The 800th MP (I/R) units did not receive Internment/Resettlement (I/R) and corrections specific training during their mobilization period.

Abandon the “two major war” basis for size of military

Putting aside the “two major war” approach is more a matter of the size of the military than of planning for war. For about a decade, the military has used the possibility of having to fight wars in two places -- Korea and Iraq are the two examples frequently used -- to figure out the minimum number of troops, airplanes, ships and gear needed. Among other things, abandoning the approach will remove a floor that for years has kept the active-duty military at about 1.4 million people. [The new policy would] put less emphasis on preparing for conventional warfare and more on handling murkier situations.

Boost defense spending by $200B over next 6 years

President Bush, who called for increasing defense spending by $45 billion over nine years, has ordered Rumsfeld to review ways to modernize the military. Rumsfeld is expected to propose:
• Investing more in satellites, unmanned aircraft, and space technology
• De-emphasizing the role of ground troops
• Retiring B-1 bombers, which cost $200 million each, and purchasing more B-2 Stealth bombers, at about $650 million each
• Replacing aging aircraft much sooner than the current life cycle of 30-40 years
• Contracting with private companies for some non-military functions such as maintenance, supply, and accounting.

Missile defense is a moral imperative

“No U.S. president can responsibly say that his defense policy is calculated and designed to leave the American people undefended against threats that are known to exist,“ Rumsfeld said. He said Bush would not wait until technology can provide for a perfect defense. He did not mention a timetable. ”It is not so much a technical question as a matter of a president’s constitutional responsibility,“ Rumsfeld said. ”Indeed, it is in many respects ... a moral issue.“

MAD deterred in Cold War; now deter with missile defense

The American people must not be left completely defenseless. Therefore, the United States intends to develop and deploy a missile defense designed to defend our people and forces against a limited ballistic missile attack, and is prepared to assist friends and allies threatened by missile attack to deploy such defenses. These systems will be a threat to no one. That is a fact. They should be of concern to no one, save those who would threaten others.

North Korea & Iran could threaten US with nukes soon

Rumsfeld headed a bipartisan commission which concluded two years ago that North Korea, Iran and other countries could threaten American security with long-range missiles more rapidly than American intelligence analysts had predicted. But Rumsfeld made the point today that, while Bush has said he intends to deploy a missile-defense system, “I know of no decisions that have been made by him or by me with respect to exactly what form that might take.” Rumsfeld further emphasized that his commission made no recommendation on whether such a system should be deployed.

Deploy missile defense at home and for allies abroad

Effective missile defense -- not only homeland defense but also the ability to defend U.S. allies abroad and our friends -- must be achieved in the most cost-effective manner that modern technology offers.

Involve Russia in negotiations about SDI & nukes

A: You would obviously want to be in negotiations with Russia. I must say, I think that the Russian stockpile, or capabilities, are going to go down anyway because of the circumstances of their economy.

Agrees with Bush on 21st century military reforms

2004: Offered to resign over Abu Ghraib

Four days later, Don sent another, longer letter: "I have concluded that the damage from the acts of abuse that happened on my watch, by individuals for whose conduct I a ultimately responsible, can best be responded to by my resignation."

I respected Don for repeating his offer. It was clear his earlier message had not been a mere formality; he was serious about leaving. It was a testament to his character, his loyalty to the office, & his understanding of the damage Abu Ghraib was causing. I seriously considered accepting his advice. But a big factor held me back: There was no obvious replacement for Don, and I couldn't afford to create a vacuum at the top of Defense.

No policy of abuse, but Abu Ghraib shows high-level failure

Investigations into the allegations [resulted] in 66 substantiated cases. The abuses were widespread. There is no evidence of a policy of abuse promulgated by senior officials. Still, the abuses were not just the failure of some individuals to follow known standards-there is both institutional and personal responsibility at a higher level.

Report: Rumsfeld doubled allowable interrogation methods

In Afghanistan, all forces used FM 34-52 as a baseline for interrogation technique. Nonetheless, more aggressive interrogation of detainees appears to have been on-going. Interrogators and lists of techniques circulated from Guantanamo and Afghanistan to Iraq. Techniques effective under carefully controlled conditions at Guantanamo became far more problematic when they migrated.

Abu Ghraib interrogators followed inconsistent orders

The policy memos allowed for interpretation in several areas and did not adequately set forth the limits of interrogation techniques. The existence of confusing and inconsistent interrogation policies contributed to the belief that additional interrogation techniques were condoned.

Abu Ghraib report: Need more definitions and reform

The Independent Panel provides the following recommendations:
1. The US should further define its policy on the categorization and status of all detainees, in a way consistent with US jurisprudence and with US interpretation of the Geneva Conventions
2. DoD should define the appropriate collaboration between military intelligence and military police in a detention facility. The meaning of “setting the conditions” for interrogation needs to be defined with precision.
3. The nation needs more specialist for detention/interrogation operations. other than lack of leadership, training deficiencies in both MP and MI units have been cited most often as he needed measures to prevent detainee abuse.
4. All personnel who may be engaged in detention operations should participate in a professional ethics program.
5. The US needs to adapt its approach to international humanitarian law to the realities of conflict in the 21st century.

Fay report: Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse was physical & sexual

The allegations of abuse were substantiated by detailed witness statements and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence. Due to the extremely sensitive nature of these photographs and videos, the ongoing CID investigation, and the potential for the criminal prosecution of several suspects, the photographic evidence is not included in the body of my investigation. I find that the intentional abuse of detainees by military police personnel included [numerous types of both physical and sexual abuse].

Abu Ghraib MPs told by interrogators to “set the conditions”

Fay Report: relieve from command officers at Abu Ghraib

Several US Army Soldiers have committed egregious acts and grave breaches of international law at Abu Ghraib/BCCF and Camp Bucca, Iraq. Furthermore, key senior leaders in both the 800th MP Brigade and the 205th MI Brigade failed to comply with established regulations, policies, and command directives in preventing detainee abuses. [[The LTG Jones and MG Fay investigation recommends that the following officers be relieved from Command and receive a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand]:
• BG Janis L. Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP
• COL Thomas M. Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade
• LTC (P) Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion
• LTC Steven L. Jordan, Former Director, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center and Liaison Officer to 205th Military Intelligence Brigade
• MAJ David W. DiNenna, Sr., S-3, 320th MP Battalion
• CPT Donald J. Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company
• 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company

Increase defense spending to meet global responsibilities.

American defense policy is adrift. Conservatives have not fought for a defense budget that would maintain American security and advance American interests in the new century. We aim to change this.

We are living off the capital--both the military investments and the foreign policy achievements--built up by past administrations. Cuts in foreign affairs and defense spending, inattention to the tools of statecraft, and inconstant leadership are making it increasingly difficult to sustain American influence around the world. As a consequence, we are jeopardizing the nation's ability to meet present threats and to deal with potentially greater challenges that lie ahead.

We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan Administration's success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges.

We need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future;