Deal with terrorism as a joint federal-state responsibility.

• Handling Information Needs.
  Many of the operational, programmatic, and funding activities associated with terrorism consequence management preparedness are classified because of national security. Thus, the sharing of critical information is hampered. State governments must be viewed as strong partners in the US’ national security efforts, particularly as related to terrorism.
• Managing Consequences.
  Managing the short- and long-term consequences of terrorism is among the responsibilities of state and local government supplemented by the resources of the federal government, coordinated by FEMA.
• Supporting Public-Private Cooperation.
  Terrorism preparedness efforts should be inclusive of key private sector entities such as defining the appropriate roles and responsibilities for public and private health and medical communities.
• Clarifying the Role of the National Guard.
  The role of the National Guard in terrorism response activities is to support federal, state, and local response agencies with equipment, facilities, and personnel. Any assignment of responsibility should enhance the nation’s terrorism consequence management capability and provide for the contingency of the National Guard being called to assist active and reserve components in dealing with a major military conflict.
• Federal Responsibility
  Governors recognize the need to coordinate programs among federal agencies to address domestic terrorism and appreciate the efforts of the National Domestic Preparedness Office. However, they encourage greater clarification of the currently fragmented structure of federal responsibilities and support increased cooperation among federal agencies to better enable states to plan for domestic terrorism responses. Governors urge appropriate funding, maximum coordination of program components, and coordinated service delivery within states and localities.

Include states in anti-terrorism planning.

The Issue

NGA’s Position

Study terrorist threats against nuclear waste repositories.

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) should reexamine the issue of terrorism and sabotage against spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste shipments in order to determine the adequacy of the current physical protection regulations, as part of the NRC licensing process for a geologic repository or an interim storage facility.
2. The NRC should conduct a comprehensive assessment of the consequences of attacks that have the potential for radiological sabotage, including attacks against transportation infrastructure used by nuclear waste shipments, attacks involving capture of a nuclear waste shipment and use of high energy explosives against the cask, and direct attacks upon a nuclear waste shipping cask using antitank missiles.
3. The NRC should conduct the comprehensive reassessment of terrorism/sabotage consequences in a forum conducive to meaningful participation by all affected stakeholders, including the creation of a stakeholder advisory group to assist the NRC in this task.
4. DOE should also fully evaluate the impacts of terrorism and sabotage against spent fuel and nuclear waste shipments in the Yucca Mountain and in any interim storage facility.
5. DOE should incorporate terrorism/sabotage risk management and countermeasures in all DOE transportation plans relating to operation of a repository, interim storage facility, and/or intermodal transfer facility, including liability for costs and damages resulting from terrorism/sabotage against nuclear waste shipments.
6. DOE is encouraged to expeditiously complete the Department’s guidance process for codifying the “Transportation Protocol Manual,” [with] review with the participating states and tribes prior to formal adoption.
7. The governors encourage NRC, DOT and DOE to use the “Transportation Protocol Manual” as the beginning point for requirements for the transport of both federal and commercial radioactive materials.