Orrin Hatch on War & Peace Republican Sr Senator (UT)

Supports air strikes to destroy Serbian military

Supported arming Bosnians in 1992 & bombing Milosevic then

No limits once engaged; but need a clear mission

NATO actions did not cause refugees; we should respond

If we continue air strikes, no need for ground troops

Rambouillet is irrelevant: finish destroying Serb military

Sanctions on Serbia until Milosevic falls

Serbs should lose at least a part of Kosovo

Air power should destroy military, not change regime

No US peacekeepers unless goals are clear

Voted NO on redeploying non-essential US troops out of Iraq in 9 months.

• The President shall commence the safe, phased redeployment of members of the US Armed Forces from Iraq who are not essential to the [new limited mission].
• Such redeployment shall begin not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
• No funds under any provision of law may be expended to continue the deployment in Iraq of members of the US Armed Forces after 9 months.

Proponents support voting YES because:

Sen. LEVIN: "The amendment requires redeployment be completed within 9 months. At that point, funding for the war would be ended, with four narrow exceptions:"

1. Security for US Government personnel and infrastructure
2. Training Iraqi security forces
3. Equipment to US service men and women to ensure their safety

Opponents recommend voting NO because:

Sen. McCAIN: "This year, after nearly 4 years of mismanaged war, our military has made significant gains under the so-called surge. Overall violence in Iraq has fallen to its lowest level since [2003]. Improvised explosive device blasts now occur at a rate lower than at any point since September 2004.

"Al-Qaida's leadership knows which side is winning in Iraq. It may not be known in some parts of America and in this body, but al-Qaida knows. We are succeeding under the new strategy.

"Given these realities, some proponents of precipitous withdrawal from Iraq have shifted their focus. While conceding, finally, that there have been dramatic security gains, they have begun seizing on the lackluster performance of the Iraqi Government to insist that we should abandon the successful strategy and withdraw U.S. forces. This would be a terrible mistake."

Voted YES on designating Iran's Revolutionary Guards as terrorists.

• that it is a vital US national interest to prevent the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran from turning Shi'a militia extremists in Iraq into a Hezbollah-like force;
• that it should be US policy to combat, contain, and roll back the violent activities and destabilizing influence inside Iraq of the Government of Iran;
• to support the prudent and calibrated use of all instruments of power in Iraq, including diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and military instruments, in support of the policy;
• that the US should designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist organization.

Proponents support voting YES because:

Sen. LIEBERMAN: Some of our colleagues thought the Sense of the Senate may have opened the door to some kind of military action against Iran [so we removed some text]. That is not our intention. In fact, our intention is to increase the economic pressure on Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps so that we will never have to consider the use of the military to stop them from what they are doing to kill our soldiers.

Opponents recommend voting NO because:

Sen. BIDEN. I will oppose the Kyl-Lieberman amendment for one simple reason: this administration cannot be trusted. I am very concerned about the evidence that suggests that Iran is engaged in destabilizing activities inside Iraq. Arguably, if we had a different President who abided by the meaning and intent of laws we pass, I might support this amendment. I fear, however, that this President might use the designation of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist entity as a pretext to use force against Iran as he sees fit. [The same was done with the Senate resolution on Iraq in 2002]. Given this President's actions and misuse of authority, I cannot support the amendment.

Voted NO on redeploying US troops out of Iraq by March 2008.

Proponents recommend voting YES because:

Our troops are caught in the midst of a civil war. The administration has begun to escalate this war with 21,000 more troops. This idea is not a new one. During this war, four previous surges have all failed. It is time for a different direction. It is time for a drawdown of our troops.

Opponents recommend voting NO because:

This resolution calls for imposing an artificial timeline to withdraw our troops from Iraq, regardless of the conditions on the ground or the consequences of defeat; a defeat that will surely be added to what is unfortunately a growing list of American humiliations. This legislation would hobble American commanders in the field and substantially endanger America's strategic objective of a unified federal democratic Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself and be an ally in the war against Islamic fascism. The unintended consequence of this resolution is to bring to reality Osama bin Laden's vision for Iraq; that after 4 years of fighting in Iraq the US Congress loses its will to fight. If we leave Iraq before the job is done, as surely as night follows day, the terrorists will follow us home. Osama bin Laden has openly said: America does not have the stomach to stay in the fight. He is a fanatic. He is an Islamic fascist. He is determined to destroy us and our way of life.

Voted NO on redeploying troops out of Iraq by July 2007.

1. The President shall redeploy, commencing in 2006, US forces from Iraq by July 1, 2007, leaving only the minimal number of forces that are critical to completing the mission of standing up Iraqi security forces and conducting specialized counterterrorism operations.
2. The President should maintain an over-the-horizon troop presence to prosecute the war on terror and protect regional security interests.
3. Within 30 days, the administration shall submit to Congress a report that sets forth the strategy for the redeployment of US forces from Iraq by July 1, 2007.

Opponents of the Resolution say:
• This amendment would withdraw American forces from Iraq without regard to the real conditions on the ground.
• The consequences of an American retreat would be terrible for the security of the American people at home.
• Our commitment is not open-ended. It is conditional on the Iraqis moving toward self-government and self-defense.

Supporters of the Resolution say:
• Congress talks almost incessantly about the situation in Iraq as if on 9/11 the situation involved Iraq. Of course, it didn't. We were attacked by al-Qaida operating out of Afghanistan on 9/11.
• One of the theories we hear is that somehow staying in Iraq is necessary because all the terrorists will come into Iraq, and then they wouldn't be able to attack us anywhere else. Some call this the roach-motel theory. The fact is, al-Qaida is operating in 60 to 80 countries. Yet our resources are only heavily focused on this Iraq situation.
• In terms of differences from other Iraq amendments: This is binding, not just a sense of the Senate.
• Secondly, we have a date; other amendments are open-ended.
• Thirdly, this has an over-the-horizon force specifically to protect our security interests.

Voted NO on investigating contract awards in Iraq & Afghanistan.

Voted YES on requiring on-budget funding for Iraq, not emergency funding.

• Request all future funding for ongoing military operations overseas, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, be included in the President's annual fiscal year budget proposal
• Call for the President to submit to Congress by Sept. 1, 2005, an amendment to his annual fiscal budget, that details estimated costs for ongoing military operations overseas.
• Ask that all future funding requests for ongoing military operations overseas appear in the appropriation bills in which such expenditures are normally included.

Voted YES on $86 billion for military operations in Iraq & Afghanistan.

• $5.1 billion for security
• $5.2 billion for reconstruction costs
• $65.6 billion for military operations and maintenance
• $1.3 billion for veterans medical care
• $10 billion as a loan that would be converted to a grant if 90% of all bilateral debt incurred by the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, would have to be forgiven by other countries.

Voted YES on authorizing use of military force against Iraq.

Voted NO on allowing all necessary force in Kosovo.

Voted YES on authorizing air strikes in Kosovo.

Voted YES on ending the Bosnian arms embargo.

CIA mischaracterized Iraq WMD & abused intelligence position.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
• Conclusion 1. Most of the major key judgments in the Oct. 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq's Continuing Programs for WMD, either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of failures led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence.
• Conclusion 2. The Intelligence Community (IC) did not accurately or adequately explain to policymakers the uncertainties behind the judgments in the Oct. 2002 NIE.
• Conclusion 3. The Intelligence Community suffered from a collective presumption that Iraq had an active and growing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. This "group think" dynamic led IC analysts, collectors and managers to both interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD program as well as ignore or minimize evidence that Iraq did not have active and expanding WMD programs.
• Conclusion 4. In a few significant instances, the analysis in the NIE suffers from a "layering" effect whereby assessments were built based on previous judgments without carrying forward the uncertainties of the underlying judgments.
• Conclusion 5. IC managers did not encourage analysts to challenge their assumptions, fully consider alternative arguments, accurately characterize the intelligence reporting, or counsel analysts who lost their objectivity.
• Conclusion 6. The Committee found significant short-comings in almost every aspect of human intelligence collection efforts against Iraq's WMD activities, in particular that the IC had no sources collecting against WMD in Iraq after 1998. Most, if not all, of these problems stem from a broken corporate culture and poor management, and will not be solved by additional funding and personnel.
• Conclusion 7. The CIA, in several significant instances, abused its unique position in the IC, particularly in terms of information sharing, to the detriment of the IC's prewar analysis concerning Iraq's WMD programs.

Iraq-al-Qaida contacts, but no complicity or assistance.

IRAQI LINKS TO TERRORISM
• Conclusion 90. The CIA's assessment that Saddam Hussein was most likely to use his own intelligence service operatives to conduct attacks was reasonable, and turned out to be accurate.
• Conclusion 91. The CIA's assessment that Iraq had maintained ties to several secular Palestinian terrorist groups was supported by the intelligence. The CIA was also reasonable in judging that Iraq appeared to have been reaching out to more effective terrorist groups and might have intended to employ such surrogates in the event of war.
• Conclusion 92. The CIA's examination of contacts, training, safehaven and operational cooperation as indicators of a possible Iraq-al-Qaida relationship was a reasonable and objective approach to the question.
• Conclusion 93. The CIA reasonably assessed that there were likely several instances of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida throughout the 1990s, but that these contacts did not add up to an established formal relationship.
• Conclusion 94. The CIA reasonably and objectively assessed that the most problematic area of contact between Iraq and al-Qaida were the reports of training in the use of non-conventional weapons, specifically chemical and biological weapons.
• Conclusion 95. The CIA's assessment on safehaven—that al-Qaida or associated operatives were present in Baghdad and in northeastern Iraq in an area under Kurdish control—was reasonable.
• Conclusion 96. The CIA's assessment that to date there was no evidence proving Iraqi complicity or assistance in an al-Qaida attack was reasonable and objective. No additional information has emerged to suggest otherwise.
• Conclusion 97. The CIA's judgment that Saddam Hussein, if sufficiently desperate, might employ terrorists with a global reach—al-Qaida—to conduct terrorist attacks in the event of war, was reasonable. No information has emerged thus far to suggest that Saddam did try to employ al-Qaida in conducting terrorist attacks.

CIA knew State of the Union Iraq-Niger connection was false.

NIGER CONCLUSIONS
• Conclusion 16. The language in the Oct. 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that "Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake" overstated what the Intelligence Community (IC) knew about Iraq's possible procurement attempts.
• Conclusion 18. When documents regarding the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting [weakening the Iraq-Niger connection] became available to the IC in October 2002, CIA analysts and operations officers should have made an effort to obtain copies. As a result of not obtaining the documents, CIA Iraq nuclear analysts continued to report on Iraqi efforts to procure uranium from Africa and continued to approve the use of such language in Administration publications and speeches.
• Conclusion 19. Even after obtaining the forged documents and being alerted by a State Department analyst about problems with them, analysts at both the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) did not examine them carefully enough to see the obvious problems with the documents. Both agencies continued to publish assessments that Iraq may have been seeking uranium from Africa. In addition, CIA continued to approve the use of similar language in Administration publications and speeches, including the State of the Union.
• Conclusion 21. When coordinating the State of the Union, no CIA analysts or officials told the National Security Council (NSC) to remove the "16 words" or that there were concerns about the credibility of the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting. A CIA official's original testimony to the Committee that he told an NSC official to remove the words "Niger" and "500 tons" from the speech, is incorrect.
• Conclusion 22. The Director of the CIA should have taken the time to read the State of the Union speech and fact check it himself. Had he done so, he would have been able to alert the NSC if he still had concerns about the use of the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting in a Presidential speech.

Iraq was not reconstituting its nuclear program.

NUCLEAR CONCLUSIONS
• Conclusion 27. The judgment in the NIE, that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program, was not supported by the intelligence. The Committee agrees with the State Department's alternative view that the available intelligence "does not add up to a compelling case for reconstitution."
• Conclusion 29. Numerous intelligence reports provided to the Committee showed that Iraq was trying to procure high-strength aluminum tubes. The Committee believes that the information available to the Intelligence Community indicated that these tubes were intended to be used for an Iraqi conventional rocket program and not a nuclear program.
• Conclusion 31. The Intelligence Community's position in the NIE that the composition and dimensions of the aluminum tubes exceeded the requirements for non nuclear applications, is incorrect.
• Conclusion 33. The suggestion in the NIE that Iraq was paying excessively high costs for the aluminum tubes is incorrect. In addition, 7075-T6 aluminum is not considerably more expensive than other more readily available materials for rockets as alleged in the NIE.
• Conclusion 34. The analysis that the material composition of the tubes was unusual for rocket motor cases was incorrect, contradicted information later provided to the Committee, and represented a serious lapse for the agency with primary responsibility for conventional ground forces intelligence analysis.
• Conclusion 38. The CIA’s initial reporting on its aluminum tube spin tests was, at a minimum, misleading and, in some cases, incorrect. The fact that these tests were not coordinated with other Intelligence Community agencies is an example of continuing problems with information sharing within the Intelligence Community.
• Conclusion 39. Iraq's performance of hydrostatic pressure tests on the tubes was more indicative of their likely use for a rocket program than a centrifuge program.

Iraq was not developing its biological weapons program.

BIOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS
• Conclusion 48. The assessment in the Oct. 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that, "We judge that all key aspects—research & development, production, and weaponization—of Iraq's offensive biological weapons program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War" is not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
• Conclusion 49. The statement in the key judgments of the NIE that "Baghdad has biological weapons" overstated what was known about Iraq's biological weapons holdings. The NIE did not explain the uncertainties underlying this statement.
• Conclusion 50. The statement in the NIE that "Baghdad has mobile transportable facilities for producing bacterial and toxin biological weapons agents," overstated what the intelligence reporting suggested about an Iraqi mobile biological weapons effort and did not accurately convey to readers the uncertainties behind the source reporting.
• Conclusion 53. The statement in the key judgments of the NIE that "Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq's offensive biological weapons program" is not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
• Conclusion 55. The NIE misrepresented the United Nations Special Commission's (UNSCOM) 1999 assessment concerning Iraq's biological research capability.
• Conclusion 56. The statement in the key judgments of the NIE that "Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered biological weapons agents," overstated both the intelligence reporting and analysts assessments of Iraq's development of genetically engineered biological agents.
• Conclusion 57. The assessment in the NIE that "Iraq has ... dry biological weapons (BW) agents in its arsenal" is not supported by the intelligence information provided to the Committee.

Iraq was not developing its chemical weapons program.

CHEMICAL CONCLUSIONS
• Conclusion 58. The statement in the key judgments of the October 2002 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate that "Baghdad has ... chemical weapons" overstated both what was known about Iraq's chemical weapons holdings and what intelligence analysts judged about Iraq's chemical weapons holdings.
• Conclusion 59. The judgment in the October 2002 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate that Iraq was expanding its chemical industry primarily to support chemical weapons production overstated both what was known about expansion of Iraq's chemical industry and what intelligence analysts judged about expansion of Iraq's chemical industry.
• Conclusion 61. The Intelligence Community's assessment that "Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of chemical weapons agents — much of it added in the last year," was an analytical judgment and not based on intelligence reporting that indicated the existence of an Iraqi chemical weapons stockpile of this size.
• Conclusion 62. The Intelligence Community's assessment that Iraq had experience in manufacturing chemical weapons bombs, artillery rockets and projectiles was reasonable based on intelligence derived from Iraqi declarations.
• Conclusion 63. The National Intelligence Estimate assessment that "Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limited chemical weapons production hidden within Iraq's legitimate chemical industry" was not substantiated by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
• Conclusion 64. The National Intelligence Estimate accurately represented information known about Iraq's procurement of defensive equipment.

Iraq was developing missiles, but not to reach the US.

DELIVERY CONCLUSIONS
• Conclusion 65. The Intelligence Community (IC) assessment that Iraq retains a small force of Scud-type ballistic missiles was reasonable based on the information provided to the Committee. The estimate that Iraq retained "up to a few dozen Scud-variant missiles," was clearly explained in the body of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) to be an assessment based "on no direct evidence."
• Conclusion 66. The assessments that Iraq was in the final stages of development of [missiles] which exceed the 150-km UN range limit, were reasonable judgments based on the intelligence available to the Committee.
• Conclusion 68. The IC assessment in the key judgments section of the NIE that Iraq was developing an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) "probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents" overstated both what was known about the mission of Iraq's small UAVs and what intelligence analysts judged about the likely mission of Iraq's small UAVs. The Air Force footnote which indicated that biological weapons (BW) delivery was a possible, though unlikely, mission more accurately reflected the body of intelligence reporting.
• Conclusion 70. The IC's assessment that Iraq's procurement of US-specific mapping software for its UAV "strongly suggests that Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the US" was not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
• Conclusion 71. The CIA's failure to share all of the intelligence reporting regarding Iraq's attempts to acquire US mapping software with other IC agencies left those analysts with an incomplete understanding of the issue. This lack of information sharing may have led some analysts to agree to a position that they otherwise would not have supported.
• Conclusion 72. Much of the information provided or cleared by the CIA for inclusion in Secretary Powell's speech was overstated, misleading, or incorrect.

Deploy UN multinational peacekeeping force in Darfur.

Calling for the urgent deployment of a robust and effective multinational peacekeeping mission with sufficient size, resources, leadership, and mandate to protect civilians in Darfur.

• Whereas hundreds of thousands of people have died and approximately 2,500,000 people have been displaced in Darfur, Sudan since 2003;
• Whereas Congress declared on July 22, 2004 that the atrocities in Darfur were genocide;
• Whereas the Sudanese President refused to allow the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force to Darfur;
• Whereas deliberately targeting civilians and people providing humanitarian assistance during an armed conflict is a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law, and those who commit such violations must be held accountable;
• Whereas on June 11, 2007, Sudanese President al-Bashir pledged to accept unconditionally the full United Nations-African Union hybrid deployment;
• Whereas to establish conditions of peace and security, the peacekeeping mission must be accompanied by a peace-building process among the parties to the conflict;
• Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the Senate urges the President of the US to work with members of the UN Security Council and the African Union to ensure the expeditious deployment of the United Nations-African Union hybrid peacekeeping force with a mandate affirming that civilian protection is a primary mission objective;
• Provide the UN-African Union hybrid force with sufficient logistical support and airlift capacity; and necessary vehicles, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters for tactical reconnaissance and armed deterrence;
• Be prepared to implement meaningful measures, including the imposition of multilateral sanctions, an arms embargo, and a no-fly zone for Sudanese military flights over Darfur, if the Government of Sudan obstructs deployment of the agreed upon peacekeeping mission.

Legislative Outcome: Agreed to by Senate by Unanimous Consent.

Iranian nuclear weapons: prevention instead of containment.

Expressing the sense of Congress regarding the nuclear program of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
• Whereas, since at least the late 1980s, Iran has engaged in a sustained pattern of illicit and deceptive activities to acquire nuclear capability;
• Whereas the UN Security Council has adopted multiple resolutions since 2006 demanding the full suspension of all uranium enrichment-related activities by Iran, particularly possible military dimensions;
• Whereas, in Nov. 2011, the IAEA issued an extensive report that documents "serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme";
• Whereas top leaders of Iran have repeatedly threatened the existence of the State of Israel;
• Whereas the Department of State has designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984;
• Whereas Iran has provided weapons, training, & funding to terrorist groups, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Shiite militias in Iraq;
• Whereas Iran had forged a "secret deal" with al Qaeda to facilitate the movement of al Qaeda fighters and funding through Iranian territory;

1. Reaffirms that the US Government has a vital interest in working together to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability;
2. warns that time is limited to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability;
3. urges continued and increasing economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran until a full and sustained suspension of all uranium enrichment-related activities;
4. expresses that the window for diplomacy is closing;
5. expresses support for the universal rights and democratic aspirations of the people of Iran;
6. strongly supports US policy to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability;
7. rejects any US policy that would rely on containment as an option in response to the Iranian nuclear threat.

Sponsored shutting down Iranian foreign reserves.

Congressional Summary:Prohibits US-based correspondent accounts or a payable-through accounts by a foreign financial institution that knowingly:

• conducted or facilitated a significant transaction on behalf of the Central Bank of Iran, or another Iranian financial institution, or a person involved in the energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors of Iran
• Authorizes sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

Arguments for and against bill: (New York Times, May 8, 2013): Seeking to escalate pressure on Iran, a bipartisan group of senators introduced legislation that would deny the Iranian government access to its foreign exchange reserves, estimated to be worth as much as $100 billion. The legislation would be the first major new sanction confronting Iran since its inconclusive round of negotiations last month on its disputed nuclear program.

Sponsors of the legislation contend that Iran is not bargaining in good faith while it continues to enrich uranium. Part of the reason, they say, is that Iran has been able to work around the worst effects of the sanctions by tapping its foreign currency reserves overseas, which are largely beyond the reach of current restrictions. "Closing the foreign currency loophole in our sanctions policy is critical in our efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability," the sponsors said.

Critics said the new legislation risked further alienating Iranians who suspect that the sanctions' true purpose is not to pressure Iran in the nuclear negotiations, but to cause an economic implosion that would lead to regime change. "When we've cemented a sanctions escalation path, we're creating a trajectory toward actual confrontation," said the founder of the National Iranian American Council, a Washington group that opposes sanctions. Some Iranian leaders, he said, see the sanctions "as a train that can only go in one direction and has no brakes."

Iran must accept long-term intrusive nuke inspection.

Excerpts from Letter from 85 Senators to President Obama We all hope that nuclear negotiations succeed in preventing Iran from ever developing a nuclear weapons capability. For diplomacy to succeed, however, we must couple our willingness to negotiate with a united and unmistakable message to the Iranian regime. We urge you to insist on the realization of these core principles with Iran:

• Iran has no inherent right to enrichment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
• Any agreement must dismantle Iran's nuclear weapons program and prevent it from ever having a path to a nuclear bomb.
• Iran has no reason to have an enrichment facility like Fordow, and that the regime must give up its heavy water reactor at Arak.
• Iran must submit to a long-term and intrusive inspection and verification regime.
• Iran must not be allowed during these negotiations to circumvent sanctions.

Opposing argument: (Cato Institute, "Enforcing Iran Nuke Deal," Jan. 25, 2017): More than anything else, the Iran nuclear deal must be kept because the alternative is a return to ever-heightening tensions and clamoring by hawks in both countries. From 2003 to 2014, years of unrelenting U.S. sanctions and confrontation, Iran went from 164 centrifuges to 19,000. The hostile approach generates a more expansive, less transparent Iranian nuclear program and increases the chances for another disastrous U.S. war in the Middle East. Let's hope the Trump administration chooses not to go that route.

Support the completion of the US mission in Iraq.

A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the Commander of Multinational Forces-Iraq and all United States personnel under his command should receive from Congress the full support necessary to carry out the United States mission in Iraq. Expresses the sense of the Senate that:

1. Congress should ensure that General David Petraeus have the necessary resources to carry out their mission in Iraq; and
2. the government of Iraq must make visible progress toward meeting the political, economic, and military benchmarks enumerated in this Resolution.

Sanctions on Iran to end nuclear program.

Expresses the sense of Congress that:
1. diplomatic efforts to address Iran's illicit nuclear efforts, unconventional and ballistic missile development programs, and support for international terrorism are more likely to be effective if the President is empowered with explicit authority to impose additional sanctions on the government of Iran;
2. US concerns regarding Iran are strictly the result of that government's actions; and
3. the people of the United States have feelings of friendship for the people of Iran and regret that developments in recent decades have created impediments to that friendship.

States that it should be US policy to:
1. support international diplomatic efforts to end Iran's uranium enrichment program and its nuclear weapons program;
2. encourage foreign governments to direct state-owned and private entities to cease all investment in, and support of, Iran's energy sector and all exports of refined petroleum products to Iran;
3. impose sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and any other Iranian financial institution engaged in proliferation activities or support of terrorist groups; and
4. work with allies to protect the international financial system from deceptive and illicit practices by Iranian financial institutions involved in proliferation activities or support of terrorist groups.

• Amends the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 to direct the President to impose sanctions if a person has made an investment of $20 million or more (or any combination of investments of at least $5 million which in the aggregate equals or exceeds $20 million in any 12-month period) that directly and significantly contributed to Iran's ability to develop its petroleum resources. (Under current law the sanction thresholds are $40 million, $10 million, and $40 million, respectively.)
• Establishes additional sanctions prohibiting specified foreign exchange, banking, and property transactions.
• Includes refined petroleum resources.

Move the US Embassy to Jerusalem.

Declares it to be U.S. policy that:
• Jerusalem remain an undivided city in which the rights of every ethnic religious group are protected;
• Jerusalem be recognized as the capital of the State of Israel;
• the U.S. Embassy in Israel be established in Jerusalem no later than May 31, 1999.
• Makes specified amounts of such funds available until expended in FY 1996 and 1997 only for construction and other costs associated with relocating the U.S. Embassy Jerusalem.