John Edwards on War & Peace Democratic Nominee for Vice President; NC Jr Senator

FactCheck: US portion of coalition losses is 88%, not 90%

CHENEY: The 90% figure is just dead wrong. When you include the Iraqi security forces that have suffered casualties, as well a the allies, they've taken almost 50% of the casualties in operations in Iraq , which leaves the US with 50%, not 90%.

FACT CHECK: Both men have a point here, but Edwards is closer to the mark. Edwards is correct counting only "coalition" forces-those of the US, Britain and the other countries that took part in the invasion and occupation of Iraq. 1,066 US service men and women had died from hostile action and other causes during the Iraq operation as of Oct. 5, of a total 1,205 for all coalition countries. That's just over 88% of the coalition deaths. For Iraqi security forces, estimates put the figure at 750, producing a total of 1,955. Of that, the Iraqi portion is 38% (not "almost 50%" as Cheney claimed) and the US total amounts to 55%.

Cheney has no answer for the failure to have adequate troops

Reports say there are not enough troops to secure Iraq

CHENEY: We've made significant progress in Iraq. We've stood up a new government that's been in power now only 90 days. The notion of additional troops is talked about frequently, but the point of success in Iraq will be reached when we have turned governance over to the Iraqi people; they have been able to establish a democratic government. They're well on their way to doing that. They will have free elections next January for the first time in history. We also are actively, rapidly training Iraqis to take on the security responsibility.

We were attacked by Osama bin Laden, not Saddam Hussein

A: Saddam Hussein needed to be confronted. Kerry and I have consistently said that. That's why we voted for the resolution. But it also means it needed to be done the right way. It means that we were prepared; that we gave the weapons inspectors time to find out what we now know, that in fact there were no weapons of mass destruction; that we didn't take our eye off the ball, which are Al Qaida, Osama bin Laden, the people who attacked us on 9/11. Now, remember, we went into Afghanistan, which was the right thing to do. But we had bin Laden cornered at Tora Bora. We had the 10th Mountain Division up in Uzbekistan available. And what did we do? The Bush administration gave the responsibility of capturing and/or killing bin Laden to Afghan warlords who, just a few weeks before, had been working with bin Laden. Our point in this is not complicated: We were attacked by Al Qaida and bin Laden.

Cheney keeps suggesting a connection between Iraq and 9/11

EDWARDS: Iran has moved forward with its nuclear weapons program. They're more dangerous today than they were four years ago. North Korea has moved forward with their nuclear weapons program, gone from one to two nuclear weapons to 6 to 8 nuclear weapons. This vice president has been an advocate for over a decade for lifting sanctions against Iran, the largest state sponsor of terrorism on the planet. It's a mistake. We should not only not lift them, we should strengthen those sanctions.

Never fight a war without enough troops and a plan to win

America cannot be safe without help and respect of allies

Implement 9/11 Report; focus on al Qaeda

Iraq war has cost America dearly

A: What we know from the intelligence report, there are several things. One is that the Al Qaeda-Hussein connection was not there. I did not believe there was a strong Al Qaeda-Hussein connection. My view is that what Bush has done in Iraq and his planning for winning the peace, has cost America dearly, and cost the possibility of success dearly. That's our focus, is what we would do, given the situation we're now in. So trying to go back and re-evaluate what we would have done is not useful to us now.

Immediately get NATO involved in Iraq

Work with allies to shut down North Korea's nuclear program

Supporting Iraq war OK, but how war was conducted not OK

EDWARDS: I took this responsibility very seriously. I said that it was critical that this not be done by America alone, that it not be an American operation, and now this is not internationalized. For the most part, it's America doing it alone, which I believe is an enormous mistake.

Q: Well, then, why didn't you not vote for it? Why didn't you insist on caveats? It was a blank check. Why?

EDWARDS: The answer is, what we did is we voted on a resolution. It is for the president to determine how to conduct the war. That's his responsibility. This president has failed in his responsibility. Neither [Kerry nor I] would've conducted this operation the way he conducted it.

Voted for war in Iraq but against $87B-and it's consistent

EDWARDS: Because I said before the first resolution was ever voted on in the Congress, that in order for this effort to be successful it was absolutely critical that when we reached this stage that it be international, that it not be an American occupation. And so long as it was that, we'd see the problems we've seen right now. Bush needed to change course. We needed to have the UN in charge of the civilian authority.

Q: So was it a protest vote?

EDWARDS: It was not a protest vote. Had I been the deciding vote, I would have voted exactly the same way. Because what would have happened, had that occurred, is the president would have immediately come back to the Congress with a plan, changing course. We came to the point where we had to stand up and take responsibility.

Saddam's trial will reveal atrocities, but won't end terror

EDWARDS: The trial of Saddam Hussein is going to reveal the atrocities that he's been engaged in and some of the incredible conduct that's occurred in Iraq during the time of his reign. But the reality of protecting the American people is, there's a still great deal of work to be done. Everybody across America knows that we have nuclear and chemical plants that are not adequately protected; that we are extraordinarily vulnerable through our ports. We don't have a comprehensive warning system in place, we don't have a comprehensive response system. And we know is that we know that terrorist cells exist all over this country. We need to do a much more effective job of putting humans inside those terrorist cells so that we can stop them before they do us harm.

Don't negotiate with Arafat, but build trust with envoy

Q: But if the Palestinian leaders say, "We're not willing to arrest these people, but this is what we are willing to do," how much would you negotiate with Hamas?

EDWARDS: The most critical thing is for us to be engaged. That's what's been missing from this administration. [Bush] flies in, he has a photo-op, he leaves. We need to be on the ground constantly. We have to find ways to reduce the level of violence, to create some level of trust so that we can move toward peace.

Leadership means standing up for what you believe in

LIEBERMAN: This is a test of leadership. I don't know how John Kerry and John Edwards can say they support the war but oppose funding. I've been over Clark's record. He took six positions on whether going to war was right.

EDWARDS: Leadership is standing up for what you believe in. I believe Saddam was a threat; I voted for the congressional resolution. Then the president says, "I want $87 billion." I am not willing to give a blank check.

KERRY: I have the experience of being on the front lines when the policy has gone wrong. Our troops are in greater danger because this president's been unwilling to share the burden.

CLARK: I want to make it clear that I would not have voted on $87 billion. The best welfare for the troops is a winning strategy. We ought to call on our commander in chief to produce it. He ought to produce it before he gets one additional penny.

Negotiating with North Korea would make world safer

EDWARDS: We should negotiate with the North Koreans. We should be tough. We should require that they stop their nuclear development program, nuclear weapons development program. We should have the absolute ability to verify that that has occurred. We should be willing to do something in return.

Partial yes on $87B-irresponsible to not support troops

EDWARDS: We have young men & women in a shooting gallery over there. It would be enormously irresponsible for any of us not to do what's necessary to support them. When we went into Iraq, the US assumed a responsibility to share with our allies the effort to reconstruct. That does not mean Bush should get a blank check.

I will vote for what's necessary to support the troops. But we have a lot of questions that have to be answered first. We have to find out how he plans to bring our allies in, how much control he plans to give up, and what is our long-term plan there.

Q: So you might vote for something less than $87 billion and cut off money for reconstruction?

EDWARDS: I will vote for what needs to be there to support our troops who are on the ground. I will not vote for the additional money unless we have an explanation about what we're going to do to share the cost with our allies.

Allies in Iraq would reduce burden on troops & taxpayers

EDWARDS: I don't accept that premise. We have to have the help of our friends and allies around the world. [First], to help relieve the burden on American troops and be able to bring some of these troops home. Second, to reduce the burden on the American taxpayer. We need to lead in a way that brings others to us and creates respect for America, because at the end of the day [that will make] a safer world.

Irresponsible to not fund troops; also to fund Halliburton

EDWARDS: Well, I'm going to do what has to be done to make sure our troops get what they need, but not without the president telling us how much this is going to cost over the long term, how long we're going to be there and who is going to share the cost with us.

Q: So if the president says, "I need $87 billion to protect the troops," you're ready to say yes to that?

EDWARDS: It would be irresponsible not to do what needs to be done to protect our troops. But having said that, it would also be irresponsible not to do something to stop this president from giving billions of dollars in American taxpayer money to companies like Halliburton in unbid contracts.

Problems in Iraq are because Bush has not led

EDWARDS: The administration needs to say to the Congress and to the American people what this war is going to cost over the long term; how long they think we're going to be there. The reason we are in this situation is because this president has not led. He has not addressed the problem of bringing in others. He has not gone to the UN in the way that he should have.

Work with other nations in war on terror

Supported Iraq invasion because of WMD threat

Bush's preemption doctrine is unnecessary and unwise

A: The Bush administration asserted a new doctrine that suggests a uniquely American right to use force wherever and whenever we decide it's appropriate. America must have a foreign policy that leads in a way that brings others to us, not that drives them away. And I say to every American family: your family is safer in a world where America is looked up to and respected, not in a world where America is hated.

Voted NO on $86.5 billion for military operations in Iraq & Afghanistan.

• $5.1 billion for security
• $5.2 billion for reconstruction costs
• $65.6 billion for military operations and maintenance
• $1.3 billion for veterans medical care
• $10 billion as a loan that would be converted to a grant if 90% of all bilateral debt incurred by the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, would have to be forgiven by other countries.

Voted YES on authorizing use of military force against Iraq.

Voted YES on allowing all necessary forces and other means in Kosovo.

Voted YES on authorizing air strikes in Kosovo.

Condemns anti-Muslim bigotry in name of anti-terrorism.

Title: Condemning bigotry and violence against Sikh Americans in the wake of terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001.

Summary: Declares that, in the quest to identify, locate, and bring to justice the perpetrators and sponsors of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the civil rights and liberties of all Americans, including Sikh-Americans, should be protected.

• Condemns bigotry and acts of violence or discrimination against any Americans, including Sikh-Americans.
• Calls upon local and Federal law enforcement authorities to: (1) work to prevent hate crimes against all Americans; and (2) prosecute to the fullest extent of the law all those who commit hate crimes.

CIA mischaracterized Iraq WMD & abused intelligence position.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
• Conclusion 1. Most of the major key judgments in the Oct. 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq's Continuing Programs for WMD, either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of failures led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence.
• Conclusion 2. The Intelligence Community (IC) did not accurately or adequately explain to policymakers the uncertainties behind the judgments in the Oct. 2002 NIE.
• Conclusion 3. The Intelligence Community suffered from a collective presumption that Iraq had an active and growing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. This "group think" dynamic led IC analysts, collectors and managers to both interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD program as well as ignore or minimize evidence that Iraq did not have active and expanding WMD programs.
• Conclusion 4. In a few significant instances, the analysis in the NIE suffers from a "layering" effect whereby assessments were built based on previous judgments without carrying forward the uncertainties of the underlying judgments.
• Conclusion 5. IC managers did not encourage analysts to challenge their assumptions, fully consider alternative arguments, accurately characterize the intelligence reporting, or counsel analysts who lost their objectivity.
• Conclusion 6. The Committee found significant short-comings in almost every aspect of human intelligence collection efforts against Iraq's WMD activities, in particular that the IC had no sources collecting against WMD in Iraq after 1998. Most, if not all, of these problems stem from a broken corporate culture and poor management, and will not be solved by additional funding and personnel.
• Conclusion 7. The CIA, in several significant instances, abused its unique position in the IC, particularly in terms of information sharing, to the detriment of the IC's prewar analysis concerning Iraq's WMD programs.

Iraq-al-Qaida contacts, but no complicity or assistance.

IRAQI LINKS TO TERRORISM
• Conclusion 90. The CIA's assessment that Saddam Hussein was most likely to use his own intelligence service operatives to conduct attacks was reasonable, and turned out to be accurate.
• Conclusion 91. The CIA's assessment that Iraq had maintained ties to several secular Palestinian terrorist groups was supported by the intelligence. The CIA was also reasonable in judging that Iraq appeared to have been reaching out to more effective terrorist groups and might have intended to employ such surrogates in the event of war.
• Conclusion 92. The CIA's examination of contacts, training, safehaven and operational cooperation as indicators of a possible Iraq-al-Qaida relationship was a reasonable and objective approach to the question.
• Conclusion 93. The CIA reasonably assessed that there were likely several instances of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida throughout the 1990s, but that these contacts did not add up to an established formal relationship.
• Conclusion 94. The CIA reasonably and objectively assessed that the most problematic area of contact between Iraq and al-Qaida were the reports of training in the use of non-conventional weapons, specifically chemical and biological weapons.
• Conclusion 95. The CIA's assessment on safehaven—that al-Qaida or associated operatives were present in Baghdad and in northeastern Iraq in an area under Kurdish control—was reasonable.
• Conclusion 96. The CIA's assessment that to date there was no evidence proving Iraqi complicity or assistance in an al-Qaida attack was reasonable and objective. No additional information has emerged to suggest otherwise.
• Conclusion 97. The CIA's judgment that Saddam Hussein, if sufficiently desperate, might employ terrorists with a global reach—al-Qaida—to conduct terrorist attacks in the event of war, was reasonable. No information has emerged thus far to suggest that Saddam did try to employ al-Qaida in conducting terrorist attacks.

CIA knew State of the Union Iraq-Niger connection was false.

NIGER CONCLUSIONS
• Conclusion 16. The language in the Oct. 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that "Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake" overstated what the Intelligence Community (IC) knew about Iraq's possible procurement attempts.
• Conclusion 18. When documents regarding the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting [weakening the Iraq-Niger connection] became available to the IC in October 2002, CIA analysts and operations officers should have made an effort to obtain copies. As a result of not obtaining the documents, CIA Iraq nuclear analysts continued to report on Iraqi efforts to procure uranium from Africa and continued to approve the use of such language in Administration publications and speeches.
• Conclusion 19. Even after obtaining the forged documents and being alerted by a State Department analyst about problems with them, analysts at both the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) did not examine them carefully enough to see the obvious problems with the documents. Both agencies continued to publish assessments that Iraq may have been seeking uranium from Africa. In addition, CIA continued to approve the use of similar language in Administration publications and speeches, including the State of the Union.
• Conclusion 21. When coordinating the State of the Union, no CIA analysts or officials told the National Security Council (NSC) to remove the "16 words" or that there were concerns about the credibility of the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting. A CIA official's original testimony to the Committee that he told an NSC official to remove the words "Niger" and "500 tons" from the speech, is incorrect.
• Conclusion 22. The Director of the CIA should have taken the time to read the State of the Union speech and fact check it himself. Had he done so, he would have been able to alert the NSC if he still had concerns about the use of the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting in a Presidential speech.

Iraq was not reconstituting its nuclear program.

NUCLEAR CONCLUSIONS
• Conclusion 27. The judgment in the NIE, that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program, was not supported by the intelligence. The Committee agrees with the State Department's alternative view that the available intelligence "does not add up to a compelling case for reconstitution."
• Conclusion 29. Numerous intelligence reports provided to the Committee showed that Iraq was trying to procure high-strength aluminum tubes. The Committee believes that the information available to the Intelligence Community indicated that these tubes were intended to be used for an Iraqi conventional rocket program and not a nuclear program.
• Conclusion 31. The Intelligence Community's position in the NIE that the composition and dimensions of the aluminum tubes exceeded the requirements for non nuclear applications, is incorrect.
• Conclusion 33. The suggestion in the NIE that Iraq was paying excessively high costs for the aluminum tubes is incorrect. In addition, 7075-T6 aluminum is not considerably more expensive than other more readily available materials for rockets as alleged in the NIE.
• Conclusion 34. The analysis that the material composition of the tubes was unusual for rocket motor cases was incorrect, contradicted information later provided to the Committee, and represented a serious lapse for the agency with primary responsibility for conventional ground forces intelligence analysis.
• Conclusion 38. The CIA’s initial reporting on its aluminum tube spin tests was, at a minimum, misleading and, in some cases, incorrect. The fact that these tests were not coordinated with other Intelligence Community agencies is an example of continuing problems with information sharing within the Intelligence Community.
• Conclusion 39. Iraq's performance of hydrostatic pressure tests on the tubes was more indicative of their likely use for a rocket program than a centrifuge program.

Iraq was not developing its biological weapons program.

BIOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS
• Conclusion 48. The assessment in the Oct. 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that, "We judge that all key aspects—research & development, production, and weaponization—of Iraq's offensive biological weapons program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War" is not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
• Conclusion 49. The statement in the key judgments of the NIE that "Baghdad has biological weapons" overstated what was known about Iraq's biological weapons holdings. The NIE did not explain the uncertainties underlying this statement.
• Conclusion 50. The statement in the NIE that "Baghdad has mobile transportable facilities for producing bacterial and toxin biological weapons agents," overstated what the intelligence reporting suggested about an Iraqi mobile biological weapons effort and did not accurately convey to readers the uncertainties behind the source reporting.
• Conclusion 53. The statement in the key judgments of the NIE that "Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq's offensive biological weapons program" is not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
• Conclusion 55. The NIE misrepresented the United Nations Special Commission's (UNSCOM) 1999 assessment concerning Iraq's biological research capability.
• Conclusion 56. The statement in the key judgments of the NIE that "Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered biological weapons agents," overstated both the intelligence reporting and analysts assessments of Iraq's development of genetically engineered biological agents.
• Conclusion 57. The assessment in the NIE that "Iraq has ... dry biological weapons (BW) agents in its arsenal" is not supported by the intelligence information provided to the Committee.

Iraq was not developing its chemical weapons program.

CHEMICAL CONCLUSIONS
• Conclusion 58. The statement in the key judgments of the October 2002 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate that "Baghdad has ... chemical weapons" overstated both what was known about Iraq's chemical weapons holdings and what intelligence analysts judged about Iraq's chemical weapons holdings.
• Conclusion 59. The judgment in the October 2002 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate that Iraq was expanding its chemical industry primarily to support chemical weapons production overstated both what was known about expansion of Iraq's chemical industry and what intelligence analysts judged about expansion of Iraq's chemical industry.
• Conclusion 61. The Intelligence Community's assessment that "Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of chemical weapons agents — much of it added in the last year," was an analytical judgment and not based on intelligence reporting that indicated the existence of an Iraqi chemical weapons stockpile of this size.
• Conclusion 62. The Intelligence Community's assessment that Iraq had experience in manufacturing chemical weapons bombs, artillery rockets and projectiles was reasonable based on intelligence derived from Iraqi declarations.
• Conclusion 63. The National Intelligence Estimate assessment that "Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limited chemical weapons production hidden within Iraq's legitimate chemical industry" was not substantiated by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
• Conclusion 64. The National Intelligence Estimate accurately represented information known about Iraq's procurement of defensive equipment.

Iraq was developing missiles, but not to reach the US.

DELIVERY CONCLUSIONS
• Conclusion 65. The Intelligence Community (IC) assessment that Iraq retains a small force of Scud-type ballistic missiles was reasonable based on the information provided to the Committee. The estimate that Iraq retained "up to a few dozen Scud-variant missiles," was clearly explained in the body of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) to be an assessment based "on no direct evidence."
• Conclusion 66. The assessments that Iraq was in the final stages of development of [missiles] which exceed the 150-km UN range limit, were reasonable judgments based on the intelligence available to the Committee.
• Conclusion 68. The IC assessment in the key judgments section of the NIE that Iraq was developing an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) "probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents" overstated both what was known about the mission of Iraq's small UAVs and what intelligence analysts judged about the likely mission of Iraq's small UAVs. The Air Force footnote which indicated that biological weapons (BW) delivery was a possible, though unlikely, mission more accurately reflected the body of intelligence reporting.
• Conclusion 70. The IC's assessment that Iraq's procurement of US-specific mapping software for its UAV "strongly suggests that Iraq is investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the US" was not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
• Conclusion 71. The CIA's failure to share all of the intelligence reporting regarding Iraq's attempts to acquire US mapping software with other IC agencies left those analysts with an incomplete understanding of the issue. This lack of information sharing may have led some analysts to agree to a position that they otherwise would not have supported.
• Conclusion 72. Much of the information provided or cleared by the CIA for inclusion in Secretary Powell's speech was overstated, misleading, or incorrect.